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ABSTRACT. This Note proposes a set of reforms that address the problem of systematic bias in
mandatory arbitration. Until now, mandatory arbitration literature has focused largely on the
pros and cons of the practice rather than on solutions to improve this form of dispute resolution.
This Note seeks to shift the debate by showing how institution-level protections can preserve
both fairness and efficiency in mandatory arbitration. I argue that the best means of enforcement
would be to create a cause of action that enables government prosecutors to bring suit to impose
monetary penalties on systematically biased arbitration providers and the businesses who hire
them. The threat of such litigation, combined with mandatory data disclosure, will incentivize
negotiated self-regulation and result in fairer practices. Because individuals will not be able to
appeal their specific arbitration decisions under this system, mandatory arbitration's central
advantage of efficiency will be preserved.
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INTRODUCTION
Mandatory arbitration offers the potential for a faster and less costly means
of dispute resolution. It holds out the promise of a process that is more
efficient and accessible for plaintiffs, yet still preferable for businesses. In
application, however, mandatory arbitration has fallen short of this goal. It
presents opportunities for abuse, and companies have used it as a means of
skewing proceedings in their favor rather than simply providing a more
efficient means of dispute resolution. Although there are numerous problems
with mandatory arbitration, fundamentally the current system is broken
because businesses can use mandatory arbitration clauses to select biased
decisionmakers who will systematically preference the drafting party over the
party signing the mandatory arbitration clause (usually a consumer or
employee).
While there is a wealth of literature attacking the shortcomings of
mandatory arbitration,' no satisfactory solution has been proposed. Proposals
for arbitration reform often focus on granting individuals the means to appeal
unjust decisions.! But by adding costly and time-consuming procedures, these
reforms neglect the primary advantages of mandatory arbitration and simply
transform the process into something more akin to traditional litigation. Other
proposals call for prohibiting mandatory arbitration for those classes of cases
where parties typically have unequal bargaining power.' But the potential
advantages of using mandatory arbitration are real. In fact, mandatory
arbitration offers the greatest benefits in cases where only a small amount of
money is at stake, a situation that often arises when parties have unequal
bargaining power.
This Note proposes a solution that ensures that mandatory arbitration will
be carried out in a more impartial manner, while at the same time preserving
its central advantages of speed, cost, and accessibility. Instead of focusing on
providing recourse to plaintiffs at the individual level, we must solve the
problems posed by mandatory arbitration through systemic reform. I propose
an enforcement scheme in which parties drafting mandatory arbitration
1. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1631
(2005) (drawing on numerous papers criticizing mandatory arbitration).
2. See, e.g., Sarah Rudolph Cole, Revising the FAA To Permit Expanded Judicial Review of
Arbitration Awards, 8 NEV. L.J. 214 (2007).
3. See, e.g., Mark E. Budnitz, The High Cost of Mandatory Consumer Arbitration, 67 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 133, 161-66 (2004); Jean R. Sternlight, Counterpoint: Fixing the Mandatory
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clauses, as well as arbitration providers themselves, are held liable when
arbitration providers engage in systematically biased adjudications. By
consolidating oversight into large cases alleging widespread unfairness rather
than pursuing individual appeals, significant costs can be saved. At the same
time, because the fundamental injustices of mandatory arbitration are caused
by systemic factors rather than discrete instances of bias, this form of oversight
would counteract the central problem posed by mandatory arbitration. This
Note is the first to propose a system of institution-level policing for mandatory
arbitration.
Liability in cases of systematic unfairness should be enforced by
government attorneys, including federal prosecutors, state attorneys general,
and other public attorneys empowered to bring affirmative civil cases (such as
city attorneys in some jurisdictions). Under such a system, because there
would be many prosecutorial actors -including fifty state attorneys general
who are each responsive to a somewhat different set of political forces -
enforcement would be much less vulnerable to regulatory capture than would
attempts to reform mandatory arbitration through the creation of a single
regulatory agency. At the same time, government actors are the best
enforcement mechanism because they are likely to exercise more restraint than
would private attorneys if a private cause of action were created. Because
government actors act with more discretion, the governing statute can be less
rigidly constructed, making liability for systematic bias easier to prove.
For this system of enforcement to be most effective, prosecutors must be
provided with the tools necessary to control misconduct. In addition to the
threat of prosecution, incentives and mechanisms should be created for
arbitration providers and parties who use mandatory arbitration to make their
systems of dispute resolution fairer. In order to accomplish these goals
simultaneously, prosecutorial enforcement of systematic bias in mandatory
arbitration should be combined with a system of limited data disclosure by
mandatory arbitration providers. This system of disclosure would allow
prosecutors to encourage self-policing by providing safe harbors for companies
that hit certain benchmarks for arbitral fairness. In addition, it would provide
judges and prosecutors with a valuable tool in determining when companies
are engaging in unfair practices. While others have advocated for data
disclosure for mandatory arbitration and one state has even implemented such
a disclosure system,' this Note is the first proposal to explain how it could be
integrated effectively into a system of enforcement.
4. California mandates quarterly disclosure of data regarding decisions by arbitration
providers. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96(a) (West 2007).
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Finally, in order to incentivize parties to actively choose fair arbitration
providers, liability should be placed directly on the party choosing the
arbitrator and on the arbitration provider itself. This would incentivize the
parties themselves to choose fair arbitrators and to monitor their own
arbitration providers to ensure that disputes are decided in a fair manner. It
would also save litigation costs by eliminating the need to prove a principal-
agent relationship between drafting parties and arbitration providers.
Although these reforms would most effectively be instituted through a
federal statute, similar but more limited results might also be achieved through
a patchwork of statewide laws, or else by regulatory action from the newly
created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. Overall, while such a system
would impose some additional costs on mandatory arbitration, it would
preserve the central efficiency advantages that mandatory arbitration provides.
The broad goal of mandatory arbitration would thus be achieved: consumers
and employees could benefit from the less cumbersome system that mandatory
arbitration provides without receiving unfair treatment in the resolution of
their disputes.
This Note proceeds by first discussing the rising use and importance of
mandatory arbitration in Part I and outlining the advantages and
disadvantages of mandatory arbitration in Part II. Part III lays out many of the
existing suggestions for reform and explains why none of these ideas
satisfactorily addresses the fundamental problems of mandatory arbitration.
Part IV describes my proposed enforcement scheme, discusses how such a
system of reforms could be implemented, and considers the effects that this
system would have on the cost and efficiency of mandatory arbitration.
I. THE EMERGENCE OF MANDATORY ARBITRATION
Mandatory arbitration has recently grown to be an area of fundamental
importance to our legal system. Over the past twenty-five years, it has become
increasingly widespread and is now commonly used in a wide variety of
contexts, including in business transactions,s employment contracts,' and
5. See, e.g., Collins v. Int'l Dairy Queen, Inc., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1465, 1467 (M.D. Ga. 1998);
Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Keating, 836 A.2d 412, 413 (Conn. 2003); Malted Mousse, Inc. v.
Steinmetz, 79 P-3d 1154, 1156 (Wash. 2003).
6. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109-10 (2001); Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991); Coady v. Asheraft & Gerel, 223 F.3 d
1, 6 (1st Cit. 2000).
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consumer claims.' Mandatory arbitration clauses now appear in nearly every
facet of our daily lives, governing contracts related to financial services (such as
mortgages, credit cards, and other loans), the sale of goods, and even
healthcare, nursing homes, and educational institutions.'
No reliable data measure the exact extent of arbitration,' and "[i]t is
difficult to assess how common mandatory arbitration clauses have become,"o
especially because of the general lack of disclosure requirements for arbitration
proceedings. However, it is clear that arbitration is now used pervasively
throughout our society." The American Arbitration Association, just one of
many large arbitration providers, conducts over ioo,ooo cases per year."
Indeed, as one commentator has observed, "It is not a hyperbole to state that
civil justice or adjudication in the United States . . . is achieved primarily
through arbitration."" The widespread and increasing use of mandatory
arbitration underscores the critical importance of finding a solution that
preserves it as an effective option for businesses but that prevents systematic
abuse.
7. See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 268 (1995); Davis v. S. Energy
Homes, Inc., 305 F.3 d 1268, 1270 (11th Cir. 2002); Borowiec v. Gateway 2000, Inc.,
8o8 N.E.2d 957, 959 (Ill. 2004).
8. Sternlight, supra note 1, at 1638-39; see also Katherine V. W. Stone, Employment Arbitration
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, in EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND WORKER
RIGHTS IN THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 27, 27 (Adrienne E. Eaton & Jeffrey H. Keefe eds.,
1999) (discussing the increasingly common presence of arbitration in the employment
context). Sternlight observes that "some companies are now using arbitration offensively, to
obtain speedy default judgments against consumers who allegedly owe them money."
Sternlight, supra note 1. at 1639.
9. Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Revolution in Law Through Arbitration, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 233,
235 (2008).
io. Sternlight, supra note 1, at 1639.
n. See, e.g., Carbonneau, supra note 9, at 235 n.8 (compiling numerous studies examining the
prevalence of arbitration); see also Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, "Volunteering"
To Arbitrate Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer's Experience,
67 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 62 (2004) (finding that at least one-third of the sampled
businesses include some form of mandatory arbitration clause in their consumer contracts).
12. Carbonneau, supra note 9, at 235-36.
13. Id. at 236.
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II. THE BENEFITS AND DRAWBACKS OF MANDATORY ARBITRATION
A. Benefits
Advocates of mandatory arbitration tout its speed, reduced cost, and
accessibility. 4 They effectively demonstrate that mandatory arbitration enjoys
specific structural advantages over traditional litigation and that greater
efficiency is necessary, especially for the resolution of certain types of disputes,
such as claims for small sums of money.
Delay is one of the largest problems in our legal system. In the last several
decades, the state and federal courts have seen increasing caseloads and have
resolved disputes at slower and slower rates. The incoming civil caseloads
reported by state courts increased by 28% between 2000 and 2oo9." Although
the number of civil cases filed in federal court has remained relatively flat over
the same timeframe, the number of civil cases pending in federal court
increased by 15% from 2000 to 2009." In other words, filed civil cases in
14. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over Predispute
Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 559, 563-64 (2001)
(arguing that mandatory arbitration allows many more plaintiffs to bring cases); Dwight
Golann, Developments in Consumer Financial Services Litigation, 43 Bus. LAw. 1o81, 1091
(1988) ("The primary advantage for consumers in binding arbitration is that it offers at least
the possibility of a faster and cheaper decisionmaking mechanism for their complaints.");
Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer Arbitration
Agreements, 2001 J. Disp. RESOL. 89, 89-90 (arguing that arbitration reduces businesses'
dispute resolution costs and that these savings are ultimately passed on to consumers); see
also Warren E. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 276-77 (1982) (citing the
speed and cost advantages of arbitration); Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arguments in Favor of the
Triumph ofArbitration, io CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 395, 423 (2009) ("[Arbitration] fills
wide gaps and makes adjudication accessible to individuals by promoting economy and
effectiveness through the provision of expertise, basic fairness, and binding
determinations.").
15. Civil Caseloads Level Off After Three Years of Growth, CT. STAT. PROJECT,
http://www.courtstatistics.org/Civil/CivilGrowth.aspx (last visited Mar. 26, 2012).
16. Compare STATISTICS Div., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD
STATISTICS -MARCH 31, 2001 tbl.C (2001), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/20oo/tables/coomarol.pdf (reporting
that 262,548 civil cases were filed in federal district courts in the twelve-month period
ending in March 2000 and that 243,422 civil cases were pending at the end of the period),
with OFFICE OF JUDGES PROGRAM, STATISTICS Div., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS-MARCH 31, 2009 tbl.C (2009), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/ederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/
2009/tables/CooMaro9.pdf (reporting that 258,535 civil cases were filed in federal district
courts in the twelve-month period ending in March 2009 and that 301,600 were pending at
the end of the period).
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federal district courts are being resolved less efficiently. The median time from
filing to trial in federal civil cases went from 20 months in 2000 to 25 months in
2009." The median civil case now takes over seven months to be resolved, and
many cases take more than three years to reach a resolution.'8
Mandatory arbitration is designed to allow for a faster dispute resolution
process. The results of arbitration are nearly always final, sparing the parties a
lengthy appeals process once a decision has been rendered.19 Arbitration also
does not require the "time-consuming procedures that must be adhered to in
court proceedings,"20 instead allowing for a more customizable, abbreviated
process that is more directly tailored to the type of dispute."
In addition, because providers of arbitration are private entities, arbitration
offers the potential to harness the power of the market to offer faster dispute
resolution. Intuitively, market competition fostered by arbitration will cut
delay most when the party selecting the arbitrator has a large incentive to see
the case resolved promptly. When this is the case (such as when a credit card
company seeks to determine whether a person with a delinquent account really
owes the money in question), we might expect that arbitration providers will
compete with each other to resolve cases as quickly as possible in order to
garner the business of the parties selecting the arbitrators.
17. Compare U.S. District Court-Judicial Caseload Profile, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/viewer.aspx?doc=/cgi-bin/cmsd2000.pl (last visited Apr. 10,
2012) (select "ALL DISTRICT COURTS" and click on "Generate") (reporting data from
2000), with U.S. District Court-Judicial Caseload Profile, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/viewer.aspx?doc=/cgi-bin/cmsd2009.pl (last visited
Apr. 10, 2012) (select "ALL DISTRICT COURTS" and click on "Generate") (reporting data
from 2009).
18. U.S. District Court-Judicial Caseload Profile, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/viewer.aspx?doc=/cgi-bin/cmsd2oiJun.pl (last visited Apr. o,
2012) (select "ALL DISTRICT COURTS" and click on "Generate") (reporting that for the
twelve-month period ending June 30, 2011, the median time from filing to disposition for
civil cases in federal district court was 7.3 months, and 13.6% of pending civil cases in federal
district court are more than three years old).
19. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-10 (2006). For a fuller discussion of the "grounds upon which a reviewing
court might vacate, modify, or correct an arbitral award," see Thomas S. Meriwether,
Comment, Limiting Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards Under the Federal Arbitration Act:
Striking the Right Balance, 44 Hous. L. REv. 739, 744-49 (2007).
20. Joshua S. Lipshutz, Note, The Court's Implicit Roadmap: Charting the Prudent Course at the
Juncture ofMandatory Arbitration Agreements and Class Action Lawsuits, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1677,
1711 (2005).
21. See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Uniform Arbitration: "One Size Fits All" Does Not Fit, 16 OHIO ST. J.
ON DIsP. RESOL. 759, 774 (2ool) ("Because parties can customize the proceedings to suit
their interests, arbitration also has the potential for providing an acceptable result at a low
cost.").
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Finality, streamlined proceedings and market incentives also offer the
potential to make mandatory arbitration less costly. These low costs increase
accessibility by allowing plaintiffs to bring claims that are either too risky or
too small-scale to attract the attention of private lawyers." Mandatory
arbitration also saves government resources, because arbitrators are funded
privately rather than through taxpayer dollars.
Empirically, it is widely contested whether or not mandatory arbitration is
in fact faster and less costly than traditional litigation. 4 Because it is difficult to
22. See Estreicher, supra note 14, at 563.
23. See Ware, supra note 14, at 95. But see Sternlight, supra note i, at 1654 (noting that this
argument assumes that pro se representation is more successful in arbitration than in
litigation).
24. Compare CAL. DISPUTE RESOLUTION INST., CONSUMER AND EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION IN
CALIFORNIA: A REVIEW OF WEBSITE DATA POSTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 1281.96 OF THE
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 19 (2004), available at http://www.mediate.com/cdri/
cdri-print Aug 6.pdf (finding the average dispute resolution time for consumer and
employment claims to be 116 days through mandatory arbitration), Lisa Blomgren Bingham
et al., Dispute Resolution and the Vanishing Trial: Comparing Federal Government Litigation and
ADR Outcomes, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 225, 225 (2009) ("AUSAs spent an average of
$869 in neutral fees and estimated that the process saved $10,735 in litigation expenses per
case. AUSAs spent an average of 12 hours preparing for ADR and 7 hours in the ADR
process per case, which they estimated saved 88 hours of staff time and 6 months of
litigation time per case."), Joseph L. Daly & Suzanne M. Scheller, Strengthening Arbitration
by Facing Its Challenges, 28 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 67, 99-100 (2009) (noting the California
Dispute Resolution Institute study's finding, supra, and comparing it to an average time of
650 to 720 days to resolve similar claims in court), Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration
Costs and Forum Accessibility: Empirical Evidence, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 813, 815-16 (20o8)
("First, the upfront costs of arbitration will in many cases be higher than, and at best be the
same as, the upfront costs in litigation. . . . Second, for employees and consumers with small
and mid-sized claims, the availability of low-cost arbitration makes arbitration an accessible
forum, and possibly a more accessible forum than litigation. But for consumers with large
claims, and for employees not able to use low-cost arbitration, the evidence is less clear....
Third, whether arbitration is an accessible forum for claims that can only be brought on a
class basis remains uncertain."), Garry G. Mathiason & Pavneet Singh Uppal, Evaluating and
Using Employer-Initiated Arbitration Policies and Agreements: Preparing the Workplace for the
Twenty-First Century, in EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS IN
FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 875, 894 (ALI-ABA Course of Study Materials: Emp't
Discrimination & Civil Rights Actions in Fed. & State Courts, 1994) (comparing a Rand
Corporation study finding that the average case in arbitration is resolved in 8.6 months to
an observation that "[I] itigation, including an appeal, can range from three to eight years
before a final decision is rendered"), Sarah Rudolph Cole & Theodore H. Frank, The Current
State of Consumer Arbitration, DisP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 20o8, at 30, 33-34 (" [A]vailable data ...
suggest that compared to litigation, arbitration is a relatively inexpensive and fair
mechanism that produces positive outcomes for consumers."), and Michael Delikat &
Morris M. Kleiner, An Empirical Study of Dispute Resolution Mechanisms: Where Do Plaintiffs
Better Vindicate Their Rights?, Disp. RESOL. J., Nov. 2003-Jan. 2004, at 56, 58 (comparing 125
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assess whether perfectly analogous cases are being compared across regimes, it
is difficult to show definitive proof one way or the other. Nevertheless, because
of the numerous factors that facilitate more efficient dispute resolution, the
potential for mandatory arbitration to achieve these goals is clear."
B. Drawbacks
Despite these advantages, mandatory arbitration presents large potential
for abuse, particularly in cases where the parties have unequal bargaining
power. Most fundamentally, mandatory arbitration falls short as a judicial
mechanism when only one party chooses the arbitrator, because that party has
an incentive to choose an arbitrator that will treat it favorably rather than to
select an impartial decisionmaker. 6
employment discrimination lawsuits filed in the Southern District of New York with 186
arbitration claims involving employment disputes in the securities industry and finding that
the median time from filing to judgment was 16.5 months in arbitration compared to 25
months in litigation), with JAMES S. IAKALIK ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF MEDIATION AND
EARLY NEUTRAL EVALUATION UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT 34 (1996) (finding no
significant decrease in time to disposition in six court programs using mediation or early
neutral evaluation), Chester S. Chuang, Assigning the Burden of Proof in Contractual Jury
Waiver Challenges: How Valuable Is Your Right to a Jury Trial?, io EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J.
205, 210 (20o6) ("Experience has shown that resolution times for disputes that are arbitrated
are not significantly faster than disputes that are litigated in court."), Charles D. Coleman, Is
Mandatory Employment Arbitration Living Up to Its Expectations? A View from the Employer's
Perspective, 25 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 227, 236 (2010) ("There seems ... to be increasing
evidence that the assumptions that arbitration is cheaper and faster than litigation may not
be correct, or at least that those advantages may not be as significant as previously
believed."), and Robert J. MacCoun, Unintended Consequences of Court Arbitration: A
Cautionary Talefrom NewJersey, 14 JUST. SYS. J. 229 (1991) (arguing that, because arbitration
can divert many cases that would have otherwise settled, it can actually lengthen the dispute
resolution process).
25. See Bingham et al., supra note 24, at 260 ("ADR has the potential to improve dispute
processing without sacrificing the quality of justice.").
26. Mandatory arbitration also offers other means of abuse, such as "imposition of high costs"
on plaintiffs seeking to pursue arbitration, and "limitation of remedies." Sternlight, supra
note 1, at 1649-50. These include fee-shifting regimes, which place high costs on claimants,
and class action bans, which may significantly reduce accessibility for small claims. For
discussion of the problems of fee-shifting regimes and other costs that may be imposed on
the non-drafting party, see, for example, Lisa B. Bingham, Control over Dispute-System
Design and Mandatory Commercial Arbitration, 67 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 221, 237-39
(2004), which explains how the drafting party may specify an extremely inconvenient forum
for claimants; and Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, When Is Cost an Unlawful Barrier to
Alternative Dispute Resolution? The Ever Green Tree of Mandatory Employment Arbitration,
50 UCLA L. REV. 143, 191 (2002), which finds a "rapid growth of cost-shifting cases." For a
discussion of the problems posed by class action bans and proposed remedies, see, for
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Selection bias is a fundamental problem of mandatory arbitration because
there are no practical means of allowing multiple parties to choose an effective
and unbiased arbitrator together without dramatically increasing the costs of
dispute resolution. Although sometimes selection bias is obvious (such as
when a company chooses a representative of company management as an
arbitrator), it "can also be somewhat more subtle," taking place by virtue of "a
phenomenon known as the 'repeat provider' problem."" As Jean Sternlight
explains, arbitration providers such as the American Arbitration Association
(AAA) and National Arbitration Forum (NAF) compete with one another to
act as arbitrators for companies." Because companies -rather than consumers
or employees-are the ones drafting the agreements, and because these
example, Heather Bromfield, Comment, The Denial ofRelief. The Enforcement of Class Action
Waivers in Arbitration Agreements, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 315 (2009). A recent Supreme Court
ruling severely restricts states from addressing this problem on their own. See AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (holding that California's ban on class
action waivers in arbitration agreements was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act).
However, a plurality decision of the National Labor Relations Board recently held that an
employer violates section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act when it requires an
employee to sign an agreement banning joint, class, or collective claims as a condition of
employment. D. R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, at i (Jan. 3, 2012). The decision is
likely to be appealed. See NLRB Finds that D.R. Horton Engaged in Unfair Labor Practice by
Including Class Action Waiver in Mandatory Arbitration Agreement, HUNTON EMP. & LAB.
PERSP. (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.huntonlaborblog.com/2012/ol/articles/nlrb-i/nlrb
-finds-that-dr-horton-engaged-in-unfair-labor-practice-by-including-class-action-waiver
-in-mandatory-arbitration-agreement.
Whatever the ultimate reach of fee-shifting regimes and class action bans turns out to
be, it is clear that they present serious problems. Nonetheless, neither is an inherent feature
of mandatory arbitration, and each can be eliminated independently through separate
reforms. Importantly, the proposal for arbitration reform outlined in this Note would not be
mutually exclusive with proposals to cure abuses caused by these practices. Prohibitions on
class action bans and fee-shifting regimes could easily be layered on top of this proposed
system of institutional enforcement.
27. Sternlight, supra note 1, at 1650. Sternlight distinguishes this phenomenon from the related
notion of repeat-player bias, which refers to the comparative advantages companies obtain
by virtue of their greater familiarity with the arbitration process. Id. at 1650-51. For a
discussion of the repeat-player problem in mandatory arbitration, see Bingham, supra note
26; Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against Enforcement ofExecutory
Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 449, 452-53; and
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the "Haves" Come Out Ahead in Alternative Judicial Systems?:
Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 19 (1999). Menkel-Meadow's
treatment of the subject explicitly accounts for the possibility that providers may also
become repeat players. Menkel-Meadow, supra, at 35-37. For the foundational argument for
why repeat players do better in the legal system, see Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come
Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits ofLegal Change, 9 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 95 (1974).
28. Sternlight, supra note 1, at 1650.
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contracts may specify an arbitration provider, arbitration providers have an
incentive to skew their proceedings in favor of the company drafting the
agreement." They may do so either because they seek more business from a
company or simply because, over time, arbitration providers and businesses
may form informal and friendly relationships.3o
Despite the fact that arbitration selection provisions must ostensibly
provide a neutral decisionmaker," initial data confirm the presence of a repeat-
player bias." A statistical analysis from the Center for Responsible Lending
found that "[c]ompanies that have more cases before arbitrators get
consistently better results from these same arbitrators"" and that "[i] ndividual
arbitrators who favor firms over consumers receive more cases in the future."34
In the most extreme cases, this bias has manifested itself in arbitration
29. Id.
30. Cole, supra note 2, at 217 ("An institutional party, who chooses arbitration to resolve all
disputes, may have an advantage over the party who may utilize the arbitral process only
once, and only because his contract with the institutional party requires him to do so. In this
situation, the institutional party may develop informal relationships with the arbitrator,
creating an incentive for the arbitrator to find in its favor." (footnote omitted)).
31. The Federal Arbitration Act provides that courts may overturn arbitration awards "where
there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators." 9 U.S.C. § lo(a)(2) (2006). A
party may also challenge an arbitral award:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent
and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights
of any party have been prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them
that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was
not made.
Id. § io(a); see also Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 1o5 F.3d 1465, 1482 (D.C. Cit. 1997)
(including the provision of neutral arbitrators among the minimum requirements for valid
employment agreements to arbitrate); David R. Wade & Curtiss K. Behrens, Opening
Pandora's Box: Circuit City v. Adams and the Enforceability of Compulsory, Prospective
Arbitration Agreements, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 13 (2002) ("Arbitrator selection provisions must
be drafted to provide employees with a 'neutral' decision-maker.").
32. Joshua M. Frank, Stacked Deck: A Statistical Analysis of Forced Arbitration, CENTER FOR
RESPONSIBLE LENDING 1-2 (May 31, 2009), http://www.responsiblelending.org/credit
-cards/research-analysis/stacked deck.pdf.
33. Id. at i.
34. Id. at 2.
2357
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
providers directly marketing themselves as friendly to businesses," and in the
removal of individual arbitrators who rule against the companies in subsequent
cases where the same arbitration provider is used.36 Although it is difficult to
draw conclusions with certainty about arbitration provider bias because the
data are limited, 7 the initial reports are very troubling.
Unfortunately, because it is difficult to prove that biased arbitrators have
violated the law under the current legal regime, many instances of arbitrator
bias are likely occurring undetected. Although section to of the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) allows parties to challenge arbitral awards if an
arbitrator shows clear partiality or corruption, 8 individuals are incapable of
mounting challenges in all but the most obvious cases because, without access
to statistics on the disposition of proceedings and limited to only modest
amounts of discovery, they are unable even to assess accurately whether
wrongdoing has occurred.
Furthermore, because the statute only specifies that a court "may make an
order vacating the award . . . where there was evident partiality,"" courts are
free to uphold awards even when biased decisionmaking or corruption has
occurred, and seemingly no action is merited when an arbitrator's partiality is
not immediately evident. Other than the grounds laid out in section io of the
FAA, parties have little recourse to challenge arbitration results. Some courts
have held that decisions may be vacated if an "award was in manifest disregard
of the law, completely irrational, in direct conflict with public policy, [or]
arbitrary and capricious," 4o but this standard is very difficult to prove, and
courts are not required to vacate awards in these cases. Although this lack of
35. See Robert Berner & Brian Grow, Banks vs. Consumers (Guess Who Wins), BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK, June 5, 2008, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/o8 24/
b4o880 72611 39 8.htm (describing how NAF promised a "marked increase in recovery rates
over existing collection methods" in a 2007 PowerPoint presentation targeted towards
creditors).
36. See PUB. CITIZEN, THE ARBITRATION TRAP: How CREDIT CARD COMPANIES ENSNARE
CONSUMERS 30-31 (2007), http://www.citizen.org/documents/ArbitrationTrap.pdf
(highlighting the story of Elizabeth Bartholet, a Harvard law professor who resigned as an
arbitrator for NAF on account of what she perceived to be systematic bias on the part of the
provider). Prior to her resignation, Bartholet had been removed from several cases after she
issued a ruling in favor of a consumer. Videotaped Deposition of Elizabeth Bartholet, Carr v.
Gateway, Inc., No. o3-L-1271 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Sept. 26, 20o6).
37. See Sarah R. Cole & Kristen M. Blankley, Empirical Research on Consumer Arbitration: What
the Data Reveals, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1o51, lo62-64 (2009).
38. 9 U.S.C. § lo(a) (20o6).
39. Id. (emphasis added).
40. Cole, supra note 2, at 227.
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appealability is necessary to preserve the low costs of mandatory arbitration,
the complete lack of enforcement encourages arbitration providers to
preference the drafting party in subtle ways, either through unconscious bias or
willful misconduct.4'
It is true that parties drafting mandatory arbitration agreements may not
always see it as in their best interests to choose a biased arbitrator. For
example, a company may decide that the cost of consumers bringing successful
claims is sufficiently small, and the potential damage to its reputation from
using unfair arbitrators sufficiently high, for it to make sense to choose fair
arbitrators. However, because our current system has few substantive
mechanisms for detecting and deterring biased arbitrators, and often few
liability consequences when bias occurs, it is difficult even to know how often
or to what extent drafting parties are choosing biased arbitrators. What is clear
is that, because the decision to choose a biased arbitrator often holds few
consequences and affords a company the opportunity to save costs on
unfavorable judgments, the existing incentive scheme for arbitrator choice is
unacceptable.
Defenders of mandatory arbitration contend that the practice does not
present problems because rational parties will not enter into fundamentally
unfair agreements with biased decisionmakers. 42 If they do, it is their own fault
and they should accept the consequences. Although this may be the case when
parties are of equal bargaining power, this argument breaks down for
consumer and employee arbitration.
In the consumer context, practically speaking, parties cannot reasonably be
expected to know the minute details of every contract with an arbitration
agreement that they sign. Nor can consumers be expected to take the remote
risk of arbitration into account.4 1 Shoppers simply do not think about what will
41. Cf Emmanuela Truli, Liability v. Quasi-Judicial Immunity of the Arbitrator: The Case Against
Absolute Arbitral Immunity, 17 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 383, 390-91 (20o6) (noting how, in a
similar manner, arbitrator immunity "protect[s] arbitrators from every claim against them
arising from all kinds of possible and even willful misconduct on their part").
42. See, e.g., Robert A. de By & Amy L. Rudd, Court Is Not the Answer for Securities Arbitration
Disputes, 25 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 129, 133 (2007) ("The consumer can choose
to simply walk away from the contract, or choose a different provider."); Steven J. Ware,
Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law (With a Contractualist Reply to Carrington
and Haagen), 29 McGEORGE L. REv. 195 (1998) (arguing that a contractualist approach to
arbitration gives consumers freedom of choice).
43. Consumers are naturally inclined to assume that long-shot events of misfortune and dispute
will not befall them and thus will undervalue the differences between dispute resolution
policies. See Michael Spence, Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure and Producer Liability,
44 REv. EcoN. STUD. 561, 561 (1977) ("The effect of consumer misperceptions is that
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occur in the remote possibility that a dispute arises, nor can they accurately
assess these risks with the information available." Furthermore, the reality is
that in some areas, such as credit card agreements, consumers often have no
choice but to sign mandatory arbitration agreements because no alternatives
are available.4 1 Similarly, employees may have few, if any, other options but to
sign an agreement providing for mandatory arbitration. Because of these
failures of the market, if mandatory arbitration is to be used, then structures
should be put in place to ensure that the system is as fair and efficient as
possible.
III. EXISTING PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
Many different proposals for reforming mandatory arbitration have been
put forward.46 Some commentators want to ban mandatory arbitration entirely
in cases of unequal bargaining power." Others seek to offer additional
mechanisms for judicial review that could protect against biased or unethical
demand votes are miscast, and the supply-side produces the wrong products."); see also
Tom Baker & Timothy D. Lytton, Allowing Patients To Waive the Right To Sue for Medical
Malpractice: A Response to Thaler and Sunstein, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. 233, 234 (2010) (showing a
similar tendency for consumers to underestimate the risks of medical negligence).
44. See Vincent-Wayne Mitchell, Consumer Perceived Risk: Conceptualisations and Models, 33 EuR.
J. MARKETING 163, 164 (1999). In the arbitration context, see Paul D. Carrington & Paul H.
Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 331, 340, which explains the view that
pre-dispute mandatory arbitration may be a "trap for the unwary."
45. See Demaine & Hensler, supra note 11, at 64 tbl.2 (finding that nine of twelve credit card
contracts contained mandatory arbitration clauses). Mandatory arbitration is even more
pervasive in other areas. Demaine and Hensler found that seventeen of eighteen consumer
contracts for homeowner's insurance, renter's insurance, auto insurance, and health
insurance contained mandatory arbitration clauses. Id. at 63 tbl.2.
46. For an excellent discussion of many of these proposals, see Developments in the Law-Access
to Courts, 122 HARv. L. REv. 1151, 1170-81 (2009).
47. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 3. A related proposal would make arbitration agreements
binding only on the drafting party. See Suzette M. Malveaux, Is It the "Real Thing"? How
Coke's One-Way Binding Arbitration May Bridge the Divide Between Litigation and Arbitration,
2009 J. DisP. RESOL. 77; Jean R. Sternlight, In Defense of Mandatory Binding Arbitration (If
Imposed on the Company), 8 NEV. L.J. 82 (2007). Others have called for a repeal of mandatory
arbitration in specific contexts, such as contracts between nursing homes and their patients,
where it is particularly unpopular. See Suzanne M. Scheller, Arbitrating Wrongful Death
Claims for Nursing Home Patients: What Is Wrong with This Picture and How To Make It
"More" Right, 113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 527, 559 (2008); Ann E. Krasuski, Comment, Mandatory
Arbitration Agreements Do Not Belong in Nursing Home Contracts with Residents, 8 DEPAUL J.
HEALTH CARE L. 263 (2004)-
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proceedings.4' But making arbitration optional or expanding procedural
safeguards would undermine the central efficiency advantages that mandatory
arbitration provides. Alternatively, mandatory arbitration could be overseen by
a central regulatory agency. But the same repeat-player problem that causes
selection of biased arbitrators would lead to regulatory capture and ineffective
monitoring of arbitrators. Reformers have also proposed mandatory data
disclosure and ethics rules governing arbitrators.4 9 But while these are useful
building blocks for an effective system of oversight, alone they would not do
enough to counteract bias in mandatory arbitration.
A. Eliminate Mandatory Arbitration Entirely in Cases with Unequal Bargaining
Power
Many have argued that mandatory arbitration should be eliminated entirely
in cases where the parties have unequal bargaining power."o Most prominently,
former Senator Russ Feingold put forth the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009,
which declares that "no predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or
enforceable if it requires arbitration of an employment, consumer, franchise, or
civil rights dispute."" The Arbitration Fairness Act has garnered significant
support in the Senate but currently remains well short of the number of votes
that would be required for passage."
Some criticize the Arbitration Fairness Act for not going far enough,
arguing that it still allows companies to take advantage of consumers,
including by tricking them into arbitration when it is not actually favorable to
them.s" Companies might impose hidden costs or downplay other negative
features of arbitration, such as limited discovery or potentially biased
48. See Cole, supra note 2.
49. See, e.g., Gail Hillebrand, Should California's Ethics Rules Be Adopted Nationwide?: Yes! They
Represent Thoughtful Solutions to Real Problems, DisP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2002, at to.
so. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 3.
51. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, S. 931, lith Cong. § 3 (2009) (calling for the addition of a
new chapter to Title 9 of the United States Code, with the quoted language to be codified at
9 U.S.C. § 402(a)).
52. The Act was reintroduced by Senator Al Franken in 2011. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011,
S. 987, 112th Cong. (2on1). As of March 26, 2012, it has sixteen cosponsors. See Bill Summary
& Status: 112th Congress (2on - 2012): S.987, THOMAS (LIBR. OF CONGRESS), http://thomas
.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dn12: S.987: (last visited Mar. 26, 2012).
53. See Joshua T. Mandelbaum, Note, Stuck in a Bind: Can the Arbitration Fairness Act Solve the
Problems of Mandatory Binding Arbitration in the Consumer Context?, 94 IowA L. REV. 1075,
1100-02 (2009).
2361
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
arbitrators. However, the fundamental problem with the Arbitration Fairness
Act is not that it would fail to provide consumers with sufficient protection. It
is instead that rendering arbitration voluntary would often prevent companies,
consumers, and employees from taking advantage of the benefits that
mandatory arbitration provides by significantly reducing the number of cases
in which both parties would benefit from arbitration.
Allowing parties the choice between arbitration and traditional litigation
would cause rational actors in each individual case to choose the alternative
better for them, regardless of the cost to the system as a whole. A rational
individual would elect to pursue litigation over arbitration even if it increased
her own expected return by only a small fraction and imposed a very large cost
on the company and on the judicial system as a whole. Furthermore, parties
could leverage their choice of dispute resolution to increase their own returns at
the cost of the system. For example, if litigation costs were higher than
arbitration costs, then a claimant likely to prevail in a case where winning
parties may recover attorney's fees could refuse arbitration and compel a large
settlement by threatening his opponent with costly litigation. Similarly,
claimants could leverage the option of litigation into large settlements where
litigation would reveal embarrassing information that would otherwise be kept
confidential through arbitration. In these cases, because the costs of allowing
parties to elect not to choose arbitration would be spread among all consumers
and employees, allowing parties to choose whether to arbitrate would be akin
to requiring all parties to purchase very expensive insurance for only slight
risks. Although in each individual instance plaintiffs would be better off having
the choice of whether or not to arbitrate, the overall costs of contracting would
be higher for everyone.
Furthermore, allowing choice over whether to arbitrate introduces
transaction costs by allowing for the potential of negotiations over the decision
of whether to arbitrate.14 And irrational behavior by the parties could raise
costs. Cognitive biases can lead to excessive litigation." Studies have shown
that self-serving biases impede parties from agreeing to settlement; because
parties tend to overestimate their own positions, they are unlikely to negotiate
54. For instance, defendants might offer a transfer payment in exchange for an agreement to
arbitrate if litigation favored the plaintiff. See Christopher R. Drahozal, "Unfair"Arbitration
Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 695, 746-47 (showing in a model that plaintiffs should prefer to
arbitrate in cases where the transfer payment is great enough, but noting that "once a
dispute arises, the costs of agreeing to arbitrate combined with a transfer payment may be
greater than simply settling the case altogether").
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even when it would be mutually beneficial." One would expect that these same
biases could cause parties to litigate even when arbitration would be more
favorable. A potentially erroneous perception that arbitration is unfair may lead
consumers to litigate even when they would benefit from arbitration."
Thus, while banning mandatory arbitration in cases of unequal bargaining
power might be preferable to the status quo in light of the many abuses it
allows, such a solution would also undermine the central efficiency advantage
that arbitration provides. Banning mandatory arbitration would also create an
additional burden for the federal courts (because many cases not going to
arbitration would have to be litigated), could disincentivize international
commerce with the United States (because companies would no longer be able
to use arbitration agreements they are accustomed to), and could create
problems regarding the enforceability of current arbitration agreements.
B. Expand Judicial Review
Similarly, expansion of judicial review for mandatory arbitration would
undermine the central cost-saving reasons for using mandatory arbitration.s9
Although allowing for judicial review of decisions could reduce the number of
arbitrary, erratic, incorrect, and biased decisions, it would do so at the price of
allowing appeal in every single instance where such conduct occurred,
substantially increasing procedural costs."o This would undercut one of the
56. See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 5o STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1501-04 (1998); see also Linda Babcock, Xianghong Wang
& George Loewenstein, Choosing the Wrong Pond: Social Comparisons in Negotiations that
Reflect a Self-Serving Bias, iii Q.J. ECON. 1 (1996) (showing how teachers' unions and school
boards each err in their own favor in selecting "comparable" districts, creating impasses in
salary negotiations).
57. See Becky L. Jacobs, Often Wrong, Never in Doubt: How Anti-Arbitration Expectancy Bias May
Limit Access to Justice, 62 ME. L. REV. 531 (2010).
s8. See Edna Sussman, The Unintended Consequences of the Proposed Arbitration Fairness Act, FED.
LAw., May 2oo9, at 48.
59. For proposals to expand review of mandatory arbitration, see, for example, Cole, supra note
2; Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1568, 1691
(1996); and Julian J. Moore, Note, Arbitral Review (or Lack Thereof): Examining the
Procedural Fairness ofArbitrating Statutory Claims, 1oo COLUM. L. REV. 1572, 1583-98 (2ooo).
For an explanation of how this would undermine mandatory arbitration's central efficiency
advantages, see Meriwether, supra note 19, at 740, 758 & nn.io-ii, 766, 768.
6o. Eliminating arbitral immunity and allowing claimants to sue arbitrators would similarly
increase procedural costs by allowing potential legal action in every case of alleged
misconduct. See Dennis R. Nolan & Roger I. Abrams, Arbitral Immunity, 11 INDUs. REL. L.J.
228, 237, 255 (1989).
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fundamental differences between mandatory arbitration and litigation: finality.
To the extent that a greater array of appeals is permitted in mandatory
arbitration, the process would resemble litigation more and more closely.
Median litigation costs in cases requiring discovery, which would be
required in such an appeal, are "$l5,ooo for plaintiffs and $20,000 for
defendants,"" dwarfing the amount at stake in small consumer claims.
Although neither plaintiffs nor defendants would ever pay such high sums in
cases with less at stake, median costs are illustrative of the usual price of such
procedures and thus of how many plaintiffs would be kept out of court
through unwillingness to shoulder these costs. Furthermore, while parties with
the resources to appeal might be able to ensure more fairness in the process,
businesses could tailor unfair proceedings towards claimants who they
expected would not have resources to appeal, potentially creating a system with
62.
even more bias towards those with the fewest resources.
C. Government Regulation or Inclusion ofan Institutional Middleman
Another option would be to create a central regulator that either appointed
neutral arbitrators directly or monitored and policed the activities of arbitration
providers.6 ' However, such a solution would not solve the repeat-player
problem. An administrative agency charged with either task would be very
61. Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in Federal Civil
Litigation, 60 DuKE L.J. 765, 770 (2010).
62. In addition, because allowing for judicial review would compromise the finality of judgment
provided for in section 2 of the FAA and because section io of the FAA lays out grounds for
vacating an award, there is a significant possibility that any statewide expansion of judicial
review would be preempted by federal law. In Hall Street Associates, L.L. C. v. Mattel, Inc.,
552 U.S. 576, 586, 590 (20o8), the Court held that parties may not contractually provide for
heightened judicial review under the FAA but left open the question of whether state
legislation may provide for additional review. Since this decision, however, the Court has
enunciated a strong position regarding the preemptive effect of the FAA. See AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); cf Brian T. Burns, Note, Freedom, Finality, and
Federal Preemption: Seeking Expanded Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards Under State Law
After Hall Street, 78 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1813, 1865-73 (2010) (arguing that the FAA should
preempt state laws permitting contractual expansion of judicial review). Thus, any proposal
to expand judicial review meaningfully would likely require federal legislation, a remote
prospect in today's Congress.
63. One example of such a proposal calls for the creation of an "institutional middleman" that
would choose arbitrators for disputes and "could serve as a processor for financial
transactions and offer oversight of the arbitration process." Bradley Dillon-Coffman,
Comment, Revising the Revision: Procedural Alternatives to the Arbitration Fairness Act,
57 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1121 (2010).
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vulnerable to regulatory capture by industries favoring mandatory arbitration.'#
And any private intermediary between drafting parties and arbitration
providers would likely provide as little oversight as possible and choose
favorable arbitrators in order to ensure that it retains the business of parties
using arbitration to resolve disputes. Although regulation by a central actor
might initially be enforced thoroughly, it is likely that over time such
regulations would be watered down, ignored, and filled with loopholes. 65 If
oversight were provided by an administrative agency, creating such an agency
would be costly. This would especially be the case if the government were
charged with the task of appointing arbitrators. Mechanisms would have to be
devised to select neutral arbitrators, and a bureaucracy would have to be
created to manage and oversee the system. Furthermore, government agency
oversight would only ensure fairness to the extent that such an agency had
adequate resources and motivation to ferret out arbitral corruption. If oversight
could be dampened by lobbying efforts by arbitration providers and drafting
parties directed at only one government regulator, capture would ultimately be
inevitable because of the absence of any countervailing party with a
concentrated financial stake in the regulatory outcome.
D. Disclosure ofData Regarding Arbitration
A more promising means of mitigating arbitration bias is through increased
disclosure of data regarding arbitration outcomes.66 However, disclosure alone
is not adequate to prevent bias in mandatory arbitration.
64. See Developments in the Law-Access to Courts, supra note 46, at 1179-80; see also George J.
Stigler, The Theory ofEconomic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcoN. & MGMT. ScI. 3, 3 (1971) (laying
out the regulatory capture hypothesis, and arguing "that, as a rule, regulation is acquired by
the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit").
65. A vivid illustration of the potential of regulatory capture to render administrative oversight
nugatory can be seen in the events preceding the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of
Mexico. See Joseph Karl Grant, What Can We Learn from the 2olo BP Oil Spill?: Five
Important Corporate Law and Life Lessons, 42 McGEORGE L. REV. 809, 818-22 (2011).
66. Data disclosure is now being used as a means of regulation in a wide variety of fields.
Implementation of disclosure programs has often affected the underlying behavior of the
regulated industry and is best used in situations such as this, where victims may be unaware
of the costs being imposed on them. See, e.g., Mark A. Cohen & V. Santhakumar,
Information Disclosure as Environmental Regulation: A Theoretical Analysis, 37 ENVTL. &
RESOURCE EcON. 599, 599-601, 616 (2007). Cohen and Santhakumar's study discusses such
programs in the area of environmental regulation. It notes that a number of different
disclosure programs have caused reductions in pollution but cautions that such programs do
not always make sense from a cost-benefit perspective. It argues that such programs are best
used under the polluter pays principle "when the victim underestimates the damages caused
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Under a regime of data disclosure, arbitration providers would be required
to disclose a small amount of basic information regarding the proceedings.
Disclosure of data regarding mandatory arbitration has the potential to
improve fairness in a number of ways. It enables media organizations, as well
as consumer and employee advocacy groups, to highlight the practices of those
arbitrators with records that are especially skewed in favor of business and
reveal which companies are using the services of these unfair arbitrators.
Although behavioral economics suggests that most consumers will still
undervalue the inclusion of fair dispute resolution contracts,' knowledgeable
or particularly risk-averse consumers will be able to distinguish among
companies that use more consumer-friendly arbitrators, and companies would
be incentivized to compete for the business of these consumers. Furthermore,
companies could potentially try to avoid using arbitrators and arbitration
providers that have been cast as particularly unfair, in order to avoid the
potential public-relations disaster that might stem from such a situation.
The disadvantages of requiring disclosure of this information include the
recordkeeping costs that such a requirement would impose on the arbitration
providers68 and the potential for the published data to be mischaracterized or
misunderstood.6 9 In addition, the disclosure of too much information
regarding an arbitration case could compromise the confidentiality of the
arbitration proceedings, which, in certain contexts, can be a principal
by the pollution and the actual level of damages exceed[s] the cost of abatement." Id. at 616.
See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 499, 531-535
(2000) (discussing the use of information disclosure in a wide variety of areas, extolling the
potential virtues of such an approach, and particularly noting the success of the Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, a statute aimed at reducing exposure to
hazardous chemicals).
67. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
68. See Jaimie Kent, The Debate in California over and Implications of New Ethical Standards for
Arbitrator Disclosure: Are the Changes Valid or Appropriate?, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 903, 914
(2004) (explaining how arbitration providers resisted the regulations because they felt the
regulations increased their burdens and costs).
69. Supporters of mandatory arbitration and other observers have suggested that data disclosed
in California, which recently enacted reporting requirements, have been misconstrued and
used to mislead consumers about the fairness of arbitration. They argue that the consumer
advocacy group Public Citizen has cherry-picked data and taken advantage of the common
mistake among the general public to assume that a fair process would result in a 5o% win
rate for consumers, when in fact characteristics of the types of claims brought under
mandatory arbitration may make those claims wildly less likely to succeed. See Carbonneau,
supra note 14, at 402-03 (2009); Cole & Frank, supra note 24, at 31-32.
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motivation behind arbitration.7 o Requiring arbitration providers to disclose
information may also introduce the cost of potential liability incurred under
the disclosure statute if a provider mistakenly (or intentionally) disseminates
inaccurate information. To the extent that there is a competitive market for
arbitration providers, some of these costs will be passed either directly to the
consumers who bring arbitration claims (in the case where consumers pay
some or all of the cost of arbitration) or indirectly to all consumers who use the
products or services of a given business (in the case of businesses that pay for
the cost of arbitration).
Overall, the arguments against data disclosure are weak. Although it is true
that requiring arbitration providers to disclose data will add some costs to
mandatory arbitration, these costs are not prohibitive. Simply in order to
communicate their decisions, arbitration providers must already fill out forms
classifying claims and recording the results. The additional step of publishing
these data on a website does not seem overly burdensome. Confidentiality is
only an essential benefit of a small class of arbitrations, and these claims could
easily be exempted from data disclosure requirements if necessary." And even
with comprehensive data disclosure, arbitration could still provide a much
more private setting than litigation. Although such published data would of
course have the potential to mislead if not construed properly, so does any
information about mandatory arbitration or litigation. If misleading arguments
are advanced about this information, they can be rebutted with more credible
studies. On the whole, we should instead expect that, over time, making more
information available will lead to a better-informed citizenry.
California recently passed a law mandating that arbitration providers
publish specific data about arbitrations administered in the past five years,"
and administration of the program has posed few problems to this author's
knowledge. The state requires providers offering consumer arbitration services
to disclose, among other things, the name of the nonconsumer party involved
in each arbitration, the type of dispute involved, the number of times the
nonconsumer party has previously been a party to arbitration administered by
70. However, cases where confidentiality is important to arbitration tend not to be cases where
systematic bias is particularly likely. They include, for example, major commercial cases,
technology cases, and cases involving sensitive personal information. See Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Ethics Issues in Arbitration and Related Dispute Resolution Processes: What's
Happening and What's Not, 56 U. MIAMi L. REV. 949, 962 (2002).
71. See id. (explaining that confidentiality is a factor in "major commercial cases, modern
intellectual property and high technology cases, and in some more personal matters, like
sexual harassment or discrimination").
72. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96(a) (West 2007).
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the provider in question, the results of the dispute, and the amount of the
reward and any other relief granted. This information must either be published
on the company's website in a computer searchable format or provided free of
charge in written format to anyone who requests it. 73 Although commentators
have criticized California's regime for not focusing on certain disclosures
deemed critical to evaluating the fairness of dispute resolution proceedings,74
the program has proven that data disclosure requirements are workable in
practice.
Instead, the main problem with California's disclosure laws, and with data
disclosure requirements in general, is that they do not do enough to ensure
fairness in arbitration. California's program is particularly hamstrung by the
lack of availability of data from other states, which prevents widespread
comparison of arbitration providers and restricts the amount of data available
for analysis. But even if similar disclosures were extended nationwide,
disclosure without the potential of liability would not adequately protect
against the threat of bias in arbitration proceedings. Basic psychology suggests
that it would be absurd to expect consumers to stop buying credit cards
because of the risk that they might one day fall victim to an unjust resolution of
a dispute with the company, even if arbitrators were to disclose blatantly biased
results. Absent additional restrictions or policing of particularly skewed
behavior, the publication of data could even potentially allow businesses to
choose more expertly arbitrators who are likely to rule in their favor.
Rather than offering a standalone solution to mandatory arbitration bias,
disclosure requirements must instead be used as a piece of a broader solution.
As discussed below in Subsection IV.A.3, published data regarding arbitration
results offer their greatest potential as a tool in government prosecution of bias
and negotiation of self-regulatory enforcement. Data disclosure would alert
government attorneys and third-party public interest groups to possible bad
actors among arbitration providers, informing potential prosecutions.
Prosecutors could provide safe harbors to providers who showed greater
fairness to consumers, incentivizing providers to fall within certain
benchmarks for arbitral fairness in order to avoid a lawsuit." This would allow
disclosure to achieve the ultimate goal of making arbitration providers
73. Id.
74. See Cole & Blankley, supra note 37, at 1062-64 (noting, for example, that the data do not
include the type of claim, nor whether the company filed a counterclaim).
75. These benchmarks could be established by comparing arbitration outcomes of different
arbitration providers with one another.
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themselves more attuned to their own fairness and cause them to strive to be
more impartial.
IV. CREATING AN ENFORCEMENT STRUCTURE TO PREVENT
SYSTEMATICALLY BIASED MANDATORY ARBITRATION
As discussed above, many ideas for mandatory arbitration have been put
forward. Although some present incremental gains in fairness, none offers a
viable option for retaining the benefits of mandatory arbitration while at the
same time addressing the fundamental lack of accountability and potential bias
in arbitral decisionmaking. To do this, we must create a system of enforcement
that keeps costs low by prosecuting cases of systematic abuse rather than
allowing individual appeals. This system should require arbitration providers
to disclose a limited amount of data regarding the resolution of disputes, and it
should leverage these data in order to allow for fairer and more efficient
administration of the law. Liability should be enforced by many different
prosecutorial actors in order to prevent regulatory capture. And liability should
not lie exclusively on arbitration providers. Drafting parties should also be held
directly liable for biased and unfair actions undertaken by the arbitration
providers they select. Ultimately, this system would allow for an efficient yet
fair administration of mandatory arbitration. Individual claims would still be
final, and other procedural advantages of arbitration would be applied. But
both drafting parties and the arbitration providers they select would be
incentivized against biasing their decisionmaking processes.
A. Institution-Level Enforcement To Prevent Systematically Biased Behavior
In order to preserve the efficiency of mandatory arbitration, it is essential to
police bias at the institutional level rather than at the level of individual cases.
While it is true that such a system could not prevent each individual instance of
bias or impropriety, an institutional system could effectively prevent
mandatory arbitration decisions from being skewed systematically in favor of
the drafting party. Ultimately, consistent bias in arbitration proceedings is the
result riot of individual errors or oversights, but rather of the systematic actions
and policies employed by arbitration providers (unconsciously or not) in order
to curry favor with drafting parties. A system of institution-level policing
would place liability on organizations that engage in corrupt actions, put in
place structures that encourage systematic bias, or fail to prevent or address
partisan decisionmaking engaged in by their arbitrators. It would mandate that
arbitration providers put in place policies that require unbiased dispute
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resolution by their arbitrators and hold arbitrators to a minimum standard of
ethical behavior.
In order to effectively motivate arbitration providers and drafting parties to
self-police, a relatively broad legal standard must be created. As discussed
below in Section IV.B, prosecutorial discretion by government actors would
help prevent overenforcement in this regime. A basic standard banning
systematically biased practices would be augmented through specific
descriptions providing examples of this type of behavior and by a mandate that
providers adhere to an articulated minimum set of ethical standards. Disclosed
data could also be used as evidence in prosecutions and as a tool for
prosecutors to institute investigations only against arbitration providers with
particularly unfair results. The ability of the legal system to articulate specific
liability-inducing behaviors from a broad legal standard has been proven
numerous times in a wide variety of areas. In California, an even broader
statute of liability has already been used to hold a biased arbitration provider
and its principal employer accountable.76
Ultimately, a broad standard would incentivize a robust and efficient form
of self-regulation that would allow mandatory arbitration to achieve its
potential. Disclosed data would allow for the establishment of industry
benchmarks, which -as negotiated organically between arbitration providers,
prosecutors, and nongovernmental consumer advocacy groups-would
incentivize industry actors towards unbiased decisionmaking and ensure that
only providers who failed to meet acceptable industry standards for fair
practices would be exposed to potential liability.
76. The San Francisco City Attorney's Office recently settled a case brought against Bank of
America's credit card subsidiary, FIA Card Services, for its employment of the National
Arbitration Forum (NAF), allegedly in order to achieve biased decision outcomes. News
Release, City Att'y Dennis Herrera, Herrera Secures $5 Million Settlement, Consumer
Safeguards Against BofA Credit Card Subsidiary: Three-and-a-Half-Year-Old Case
Continues To Win Industry Reforms Nationwide To Protect Credit Card Holders in Debt
Disputes (Aug. 22, 2011), available at http://www.sfcityattorney.org/Modules/ShowDocument
.aspx?documentid=88o. San Francisco secured a $5 million penalty, as well as an agreement
prohibiting the company from using arbitration to resolve credit card disputes in California
for two years and from employing NAF for five years. Id. NAF had already agreed to cease
providing consumer credit card dispute resolution services pursuant to a prior settlement
with the Minnesota Attorney General. See Consent Judgment at 2, Minnesota v. Nat'l
Arbitration Forum, Inc., No. 27 -CV-09-18 5 50 (Minn. Dist. Ct. July 17, 2009).
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1. Legal Standard
The legal standard governing abuse of mandatory arbitration should be a
ban on "systematically biased" practices by arbitration providers. Although the
specific wording of this ban would have some effect on its enforcement, no
particular articulation of such a prohibition would be essential for the success
of a liability regime for mandatory arbitration. Instead, the critical attributes of
liability are that it ultimately set a standard for providers as a whole rather than
for individual arbitrators, that it create a rule banning any practice that has the
ultimate effect of skewing proceedings in favor of the drafting party, and that it
mandate that providers put controls in place to prevent systematic bias from
occurring.
This legal standard should be further elucidated through a nonexhaustive
list of behaviors that could be taken as evidence of systematic bias. Numerous
behaviors designed to skew proceedings have already been identified and
would be clearly banned. Most obviously, any internal memoranda or
communications attempting to skew outcomes or instructing arbitrators to bias
proceedings toward the drafting party would be evidence of systematic bias. In
addition, anything advertising "business-friendly" decision outcomes or
otherwise-biased decisionmaking to drafting parties could be used to prove
wrongdoing." Furthermore, employment practices would be scrutinized as
evidence of systematic bias. Providers would be held liable if they terminated
arbitrators for ruling in favor of consumers or if they systematically funneled
more business to arbitrators with records favoring the drafting party." While
any evidence of providers intentionally making employment decisions based on
arbitration outcomes would be clear proof of systematic bias, statistically
significant data showing that arbitration outcome was a factor in employment
decisions would also expose providers to liability. This would incentivize
providers to ensure proactively that they do not, even implicitly, favor
arbitrators with pro-drafting-party records.
77. For an example of advertising that suggests biased decisionmaking, see Berner & Grow,
supra note 35. Although such evidence would not provide definitive proofunless it explicitly
promised biased proceedings, statements such as those made by NAF could contribute to
ultimate proof of bias by a provider.
78. A 2007 Public Citizen report details how a small number of arbitrators working for NAF
handled a very large proportion of cases and ruled against consumers an overwhelming
percentage of the time, suggesting that these arbitrators received more business because of
their friendliness towards corporate clients. PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 36, at 15. Cole and
Frank criticize the Public Citizen report's overall characterization of the disposition of
claims. Cole & Frank, supra note 24, at 1. However, this critique does not disprove the claim
that NAF funneled more cases to its arbitrators who had especially pro-business records.
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Liability could not be circumscribed to a particular set of behaviors, because
rigid requirements would allow arbitration providers to escape liability by
devising methods to bias proceedings not enumerated in a liability statute.
Instead, judges would enforce a standard punishing all potentially novel
attempts at circumventing the purpose of the statute: to prevent systematically
biased proceedings in favor of the drafting party. Although such a statute
would necessarily create questions surrounding the precise contours of liability,
it would ultimately allow for a manageable and administrable enforcement
regime. Courts frequently apply more imprecise standards with respect to
fraud, duress, unconscionability, and other doctrines familiar in the contract-
law context. The basic standard of systematic bias would be further articulated
through judicial decisions. Furthermore, this system would incentivize self-
regulation and an organic process of negotiation among stakeholders to achieve
efficient enforcement.
2. Ethics Standards for Arbitration Providers
Arbitration providers would be held to a basic minimum set of ethical
requirements. The arbitration providers themselves provide a useful baseline
for establishing a set of standards to which arbitration providers would be
required to adhere, as they nearly always subscribe to a code of ethics or
analogous set of rules.79 These rules, among other things, require neutral
decisionmaking, contain protections against arbitrator conflicts of interest, and
strictly bar any partiality in the arbitration process."o Currently however, these
requirements are voluntary, so arbitration providers have little incentive to
ensure adherence to these standards.' Making these requirements mandatory
would ensure compliance.
79. See, e.g., Statement of Ethical Principles for the American Arbitration Association, an ADR
Provider Organization, Am. ARB. Ass'N, http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22036 (last visited
Apr. 1, 2011).
so. See id.
al. Other than reputational concerns, the only barriers preventing complete flouting of these
rules appear to be statutes preventing consumer fraud, deceptive trade practices, and false
advertising. Minnesota initiated a lawsuit based on these statutes in 2009. Complaint at
39-41, Minnesota v. Nat'l Arbitration Forum, Inc., No. 27-CV-09-18550 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
July 14, 2009), 2009 WL 2029918. However, these statutes set an exceedingly high bar of
misconduct, and even substantial evidence of systematically biased conduct may not provide
sufficient proof to hold a firm accountable. Minnesota was able to reach a settlement with
NAF barring the organization from participating in future consumer arbitrations, but the
arbitration provider did not admit any liability under these statutes. Consent Judgment,
supra note 76, at 1-2.
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In addition to arbitrators' own ethics codes, California has enacted a
mandatory set of ethics requirements that provides an example from which to
draw.s2 California's rules require arbitrators to "disclose all matters that could
cause a person aware of the facts to reasonably entertain a doubt that the
proposed arbitrator would be able to be impartial."" The rules then enumerate
fourteen different subjects that fall within that standard;14 these subjects run
the gamut from family relationships with a party involved in the arbitration,"
to past service as a lawyer, arbitrator, or other dispute resolution neutral for
one of the parties.86 Additional information must be disclosed for consumer
arbitrations administered by a provider organization, including any
relationships between the arbitration provider organization and a party or
lawyer,8" and any financial relationships between the arbitrator and the
arbitration provider organization "other than receiving referrals of cases.""
These conflict of interest requirements are significantly more stringent than are
those of mainstream arbitration organizations such as the American Arbitration
Association (AAA) -which drafted ethics requirements in conjunction with the
ABA- and Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services, Inc. (JAMS)."o
California's ethics rules also require arbitrators to uphold the overarching
duty to "maintain impartiality toward all participants in the arbitration at all
82. CAL. R. CT., ETHICS STANDARDS FOR NEUTRAL ARBITRATORS IN CONTRACTUAL ARBITRATION
[hereinafter ETHICS STANDARDS], available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/
ethics standards neutral arbitrators.pdf. These ethics standards are incorporated by
reference into the California Code of Civil Procedure. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE 5 1281.85(a)
(West 2007). The procedure code also imposes direct mandates on arbitrators. Id.
§§ 1281.9-1281.96. These mandates serve as a baseline floor of protection upon which the
ethics standards are permitted to build. Id. § 1281.85(a).
83. ETHICS STANDARDS, supra note 82, std. 7(d).
84. Id. std. 7(d)(i)-(1 4 ).
85. Id. std. 7(d)(1).
86. Id. std. 7 (d)( 4 )-(7).
87. Id. std. 8(b)-(c).
88. Id. std. 8(b)(1).
89. Id. std. 8(c)(1).
go. See CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES Canon II (2004) ("An
arbitrator should disclose any interest or relationship likely to affect impartiality . . . ."
(emphasis added)); Arbitrator Ethics Guidelines, JAMS, para. V(A)-(D),
http://www.jamsadr.com/arbitrators-ethics (last visited Feb. 14, 2012); see also Keisha I.
Patrick, Note, A New Era of Disclosure: California Judicial Council Enacts Arbitrator Ethics
Standards, 2003 J. DISP. RESOL. 271, 284 ("[I]t is unclear whether the JAMS and AAA
standards for disclosure are optional or required.").
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times."" Arbitrators must, among other things, refuse gifts or favors from any
interested party, conduct the arbitration "fairly, promptly, and diligently,""
avoid ex parte communications,9 4 and not accept a fee that is "in any way
contingent on the result or outcome of the arbitration."9 ' Importantly,
California requires that arbitration providers be "truthful and accurate in
marketing . . . services and . . . not make any representation that directly or
indirectly implies favoritism or a specific outcome.""6
The precise requirements of ethical conduct could be negotiated in the
formation of a statutory liability regime. The essential aspects of achieving
meaningful enforcement need only be that they provide a baseline for ethical
conduct and that breach of these standards could be taken as evidence of
systematic bias. Importantly, because these standards would be enforced at the
institutional level rather than on a decision-by-decision basis (as are
California's standards), ethics standards could be strict without creating
unacceptable costs." Thus, isolated violations that do not indicate systematic
abuse would not create liability or trigger prosecutions or appeals on their own.
91. ETHICS STANDARDS, supra note 82, std. 5.
92. Id. std. 11.
93. Id. std. 13.
94. Id. std. 14.
9s. Id. std. 16.
96. Id. std. 17.
g. California's disclosure standards have been the subject of much debate. See, e.g., Jay Folberg,
Arbitration Ethics-Is California the Future?, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 343 (2003)
(describing the debate over and aftermath of California's arbitration legislation); Kent,
supra note 68; Merrick T. Rossein & Jennifer Hope, Disclosure and Disqualification Standards
for Neutral Arbitrators: How Far To Cast the Net and What Is Sufficient To Vacate Award,
81 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 203, 206 (2007) (proposing a standard that is "less onerous" than the
California requirements); Ruth V. Glick, Should California's Ethics Rules Be Adopted
Nationwide?: No! They Are Overbroad and Likely To Discourage Use of Arbitration, DisP.
RESOL. MAG., Fall 2002, at 13 (2002); Hillebrand, supra note 49. However, California's rules
create significantly more costs than would a regime allowing only institutional enforcement,
because a breach of California's ethics standards can allow for appeal in individual cases. See
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1285 (West 2007) (providing that a party to an arbitration in which
an award has been made may petition for appeal); id. S 1286.2 (providing grounds for
vacation of an award). This creates a situation where "[t] oo many detailed directives could
create new loopholes to challenge otherwise non-contestable arbitration awards." Ruth V.
Glick, California Arbitration Reform: The Aftermath, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 119, 126 (2003)
[hereinafter Glick, California Arbitration Reform].
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3. Evidence ofArbitration Provider Bias Would Be Further Informed by Data
Disclosure
Data recording and disclosure could provide another mechanism for
ensuring that biased providers incurred liability and that fairer arbitrators
received immunity. Data would help inform prosecutions on two levels. As
discussed earlier, data disclosure could be used to help prosecutors prove cases
of wrongdoing. According to San Francisco deputy city attorneys working on
the litigation against the National Arbitration Forum, requiring the disclosure
of even just the amount of principal sued for, the interest sued for, the amount
of attorney's fees requested, and the amount awarded in each case would make
it significantly easier for attorneys to prove cases of wrongdoing."
Data regarding decisional outcomes for each arbitrator at an arbitration
firm would be tracked and could be used to determine whether or not
providers were either explicitly or implicitly funneling more cases to arbitrators
who decide significantly more often in favor of drafting parties, or whether
they were dismissing arbitrators on account of decisional outcomes. Statistical
analysis to determine whether a provider is engaging in unlawful selection of
arbitrators would proceed in much the same manner as disparate impact claims
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196499 and other antidiscrimination
statutes. Liability would only be triggered in cases where employment
decisions correlated with decisional outcomes significantly more than chance
alone would predict. Just as disparate impact liability encourages businesses
proactively to ensure that even unintentional factors do not result in structural
discrimination, statistical liability would encourage arbitration providers to
ensure that these factors did not ultimately result in biased processes.
Data disclosure could also be used as an important mechanism restricting
lawsuits to arbitration providers with particularly unfair proceedings. Data
disclosure would provide a public record of the relative fairness of different
arbitration providers. Nationwide data classified by type of arbitration claim
would prove particularly illuminating for comparing arbitration firms."'o It
would provide a much larger pool for comparison than California's data
disclosure requirements do, and the ability to compare similar claims would
98. Telephone Interview with Ronald P. Flynn & Yvonne R. Mere, Deputy City Att'ys., Office
of the S.F. City Att'y (Apr. 27, 2010).
gg. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-16, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §5 2oooa to 2000h-6 (2oo6)).
oo. For a discussion of what types of disclosures would be most illuminating, see Cole &
Blankley, supra note 37, at 1062-64.
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restrict comparison to appropriate cases."o' As discussed further in Section
IV.B, because enforcers of this liability regime would be politically accountable
actors, arbitration providers who showed fair results as compared to their peers
would be politically insulated from the threat of prosecution.
In addition, data disclosure mandates would only provide a floor for
disclosure, and providers would be free to show more. An arbitration provider
might disclose more characteristics of its arbitration claims if, for example, it
specialized in a field of arbitration in which claims were particularly likely to be
decided in favor of the drafting party simply because of the nature of the
claims. By explaining this, and by further parsing their arbitration cases,
providers could prevent being targeted based on the subject matter of their
claims and ensure that prosecutors focused on bona fide data outliers.
4. Development ofa Well-Defined Legal Standard for Liability
Although the imposition of a liability regime would initially create some
questions regarding the extent of liability, the precise legal standard would
become better and better articulated with the passage of time. Case law is
replete with examples of similar statutes whose exact contours have been
developed through time, often with definitions of prohibited conduct that are
significantly less specific than the standard I have proposed. These include, for
example, the Sherman Act"o2 (where case law has further defined an
"unreasonable" restraint of trade"o3), antidiscrimination lawslo4 (where case
law has fleshed out what it means to "discriminate" unlawfully against an
individual'05), and California's Unfair Competition Lawo 6 (where case law has
further explained what it means for a business to engage in "unfair
101. See id.
102. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7.
103. See Bob Nichols & Eric Schmitt, Antitrust Violations, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 335, 338-44 (2011)
(describing how courts have illuminated this standard).
104. E.g., 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a) (prohibiting employers from "discriminat[ing] against any
individual . . . because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin" and
proscribing behavior that "would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin").
105. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (articulating a test to
determine employment discrimination liability).
106. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2008) (giving "unfair competition" the broad
definition of, inter alia, "any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and
unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising").
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competition"' ), which has itself been used to combat systematically biased
arbitration practices.
Similarly, the precise conduct barred by a standard prohibiting systematic
bias by arbitration providers, augmented with examples, a code of arbitrator
ethics, and arbitration data, would quickly achieve further definition as soon as
case law began to grapple with the issue. Although the initial ambiguity might
provoke cautious behavior by arbitration providers eager to avoid liability,
many would regard this outcome as a positive and appropriate incentive to
ensure fairness in this relatively new system of dispute resolution. Articulating
a standard and allowing it to develop while the practice is still nascent is
preferable to delaying and imposing a standard when it would have greater
industry effects.
Furthermore, ambiguity created by the statute would be limited by the
several sources informing appropriate conduct. The ethics standard would
provide a guide to appropriate conduct; providers would be informed of their
relative fairness through disclosure; and they would know to avoid all of the
specifically enumerated examples of systematically biased conduct. Because
only government prosecutors could bring cases, a further political check would
guard against unwarranted liability. In practice, liability regimes with
significantly greater scope and ambiguity have proven workable. And the
statute suggested here would be significantly narrower than many existing
state laws, such as California's Unfair Competition Law, which allows any
consumer to bring claims in nearly any area (including situations as diverse as
environmental pollution,"' misconduct by financial institutions,' 9 and farm
animal abuse"o).
107. See, e.g., Cel-Tech Commc'ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 973 P.2d 527, 544 (Cal. 1999)
(defining "unfair" practices in the context of competition to be "conduct that threatens an
incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of one of those laws
because its effects are comparable to or the same as a violation of the law, or otherwise
significantly threatens or harms competition"). For a description of how the meaning of
California's Unfair Competition Law has been made more clear over time, see Julia B.
Strickland, Lisa M. Simonetti & Scott M. Pearson, 2008 Overview of California's Unfair
Competition Law and Consumer Legal Remedies Act, in 13TH ANNUAL CONSUMER FINANCIAL
SERVICES LITIGATION INSTITUTE 7 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser.
No. 14257, 2oo8).
io8. See James Wheaton, California Business and Professional Code Section 172oo: The Biggest
Hammer in the Tool Box?, 16 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 421 (2001).
icg. See Michele Floyd, Recent Developments in California's Unfair Competition Law Involving
Financial Institutions, 120 BANKING L.J. 8W8 (2003).
no. See Donna Mo, Comment, Unhappy Cows and Unfair Competition: Using Unfair Competition
Laws To Fight Farm Animal Abuse, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1313 (2005).
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5. Using a Robust Legal Standard To Incentivize Self-Regulation
Ultimately, perhaps the most beneficial effect of creating a robust legal
standard preventing systematically biased arbitration proceedings is that it
would incentivize the organic creation of a system of self-regulation and
informal regulatory enforcement imposed by public prosecutors and other
stakeholders. This would result in low-cost enforcement of fairness in
arbitration, which would be particularly beneficial because efficiency is such a
central concern of mandatory arbitration.
Businesses and regulators have increasingly turned to self-regulation and
voluntary compliance efforts in a wide range of areas."' In fact, as discussed
above in Subsection IV.A.2, arbitration providers themselves have embraced
this model through voluntary impositions of ethical codes. But, with neither
the threat of significant liability should such self-regulatory efforts fail nor the
means of detecting these failures, self-regulatory regimes prove impotent to
prevent abuses."' A cause of action against arbitration providers and the
drafting parties employing them would provide a means of "targeted public
enforcement .. . supply[ing] much of the impetus for effective self-regulation.""'
In addition, data disclosure would generate a wealth of information that
would bolster self-regulatory and negotiated enforcement in several crucial
ways."4 It would empower third-party consumer advocacy groups to act as
effective industry watchdogs by scrutinizing arbitration data for evidence of
wrongdoing."' These groups could leverage this data not only to monitor
in. See Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 323 (2005); see also IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE
REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 101-32 (1992) (discussing a
model of enforced self-regulation).
i2. See Estlund, supra note ill, at 335-37. Although many self-regulation regimes were initially
created in response to potential liability under various statutes, they often proved toothless
because simple implementation of a self-regulatory regime insulated companies against the
possibility of any liability. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of
Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487 (2003).
113. Estlund, supra note il, at 319.
114. "Sunshine" has been described as a crucial factor in achieving effective "responsive
regulation." Heather K. Gerken, A Third Way for the Voting Rights Act: Section 5 and the
Opt-In Approach, 1o6 COLUM. L. REV. 708, 720 (2oo6); see also AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra
note 11, at 57-58 (explaining the necessity of supplying third parties with information to
allow them to enforce regulatory compliance under these regimes).
115. See Gerken, supra note 114, at 720-21; see also AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note iii, at
54-100 (describing the potential of "tripartite" regimes that incorporate third parties such as
citizen groups, public interest watchdogs, and whistleblowers to create more effective
regulatory enforcement); Estlund, supra note ill (explaining how third-party watchdogs are
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arbitration providers, but also to apply political pressure on government
prosecutors to carry out enforcement actions against the worst offenders.116
Furthermore, prosecutors themselves could use information obtained by data
disclosure to incentivize voluntary action by negotiating automatic safe harbors
for providers who attain specific benchmarks for fairness when compared to
their peers." Benchmarking has contributed to successful enforcement in a
broad range of contexts, including voting rights,1, 8 utilities regulation,"' and
numerous other areas of administrative law.'
Thus, in contrast to a system that offers parties the opportunity to appeal
unfair or biased decisions in individual cases, the combination of data
disclosure and a credible threat of liability for systematic abuses would create
conditions where arbitration providers themselves would proactively institute
fairer procedures in order to protect themselves from litigation."' Permitting
individual appeals in cases of bias would not allow for low-cost, negotiated
an essential element in effective self-regulatory regimes). Third parties could use disclosed
data to better inform consumers about arbitration policies, helping to counteract consumers'
normal tendencies not to differentiate among products based on these policies. See supra
notes 43-44 and accompanying text. For example, disclosed data might even allow for the
creation of a "Fair Arbitrator" label (akin to Fair Trade certifications or Good Housekeeping
Seals of Approval) to help consumers differentiate among products.
116. The ability of information to empower third parties to engage in a dual-monitoring role has
been described in the administrative law context. See Gerken, supra note 114, at 721
(explaining how granting public interest groups information allows them "not only to
monitor the regulated entities, but to monitor the regulating agency itself").
117. Fairness in arbitration decision outcomes would be measured by the percentage of cases in
specific categories decided in favor of the drafting party. Providers would be considered
more "fair" if they decided more cases against the drafting party. Although theoretically the
fairest outcome would not always favor the party signing the mandatory arbitration
agreement, this conception of fairness would provide appropriate countervailing incentives
because, as discussed supra Section II.B, arbitration providers receive a natural incentive to
bias proceedings in favor of drafting parties.
n8. See Damian Williams, Note, Reconstructing Section 5: A Post-Katrina Proposal for Voting Rights
Act Reform, 116 YALE L.J. 1116 (2007) (explaining how "static benchmarking" is currently
used in voting rights law and proposing a new "dynamic benchmarking" model).
iig. See Ren Orans, C.K. Woo & William Clayton, Benchmarking the Price Reasonableness of a
Long-Term Electricity Contract, 25 ENERGY L.J. 357 (2004).
120. Michael C. Dorf& Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution ofDemocratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM.
L. REV. 267, 345-48 (1998).
121. Significantly, this system of negotiated enforcement would take place against the backstop
of the companies' ability to provide for traditional litigation, rather than mandatory
arbitration, in their contracts. In light of companies' ability to exercise this option, it is
exceedingly unlikely that prosecutors would demand compliance actions that would drive
costs above those of traditional litigation.
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solutions in the same manner because arbitration providers would not have any
single party with whom to negotiate.
B. Government Prosecutors as Enforcers
Systematic bias in mandatory arbitration could be prevented most
effectively by allowing government prosecutors across jurisdictions to enforce
this legal standard. Government prosecution would be ideal because it provides
a relatively diverse array of enforcers to curb the repeat-player risk of
regulatory capture, while at the same time allowing for prosecutorial
discretion, which is necessary when articulating a broad legal standard of
liability.
Under a regime enforced by public prosecutors, Justice Department
officials, including the various United States Attorneys, would be authorized to
bring civil liability claims. More importantly in terms of avoiding regulatory
capture, claims could also be brought by state attorneys general, who represent
a diverse array of constituencies. In addition to being numerous, state attorneys
general respond to unique sets of political factors. Arbitration providers and
drafting parties could not easily concentrate their lobbying efforts as they could
with a single regulatory agency. Attorneys general have proven capable of
effectively holding industries accountable in other cases where regulatory
capture has rendered administrative agencies impotent-most prominently
through the tobacco litigation of the 199os." So long as one state felt
122. See generally Jason Lynch, Note, Federalism, Separation of Powers, and the Role of State
Attorneys General in Multistate Litigation, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1998, 1998, 2003-2007 (2001)
(discussing and defending multistate litigation in a wide variety of areas and highlighting
the tobacco cases as a watershed moment in holding industries accountable); Peter D.
Jacobson & Kenneth E. Warner, Litigation and Public Health Policy Making: The Case of
Tobacco Control, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 769, 774-79 (1999) (generally describing the
history of tobacco litigation and explaining how state attorneys general were successful in
the 199os). Although Jacobson and Warner conclude that litigation is a "second-best
solution," they reflect on the failure of the legislative and regulatory processes "to confront
the public heath harms of tobacco," and they note both the powerful contribution that
litigation had towards holding the companies accountable and the way in which it helped
prompt a change in society's view of the industry. Jacobson & Warner, supra, at 769, 776-78,
8o. Some commentators view the tobacco litigation as a case of attorneys general
themselves being captured by the plantiffs' bar. See, e.g., Margaret A. Little, A Most
Dangerous Indiscretion: The Legal, Economic, and Political Legacy of the Governments' Tobacco
Litigation, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1143 (2001). However, as discussed infra notes 125-128 and
accompanying text, the view of attorneys general as captured by the plaintiffs bar is
unpersuasive. While it is true that the large attorneys' fees paid in the tobacco cases were
met with widespread criticism, see, e.g., 'Outrageous' Tobacco Legal Fees Spark Writ Lawyers
To Get $2.3 Billion, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Jan. 27, 1998, at 1 METRO, the fallout
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comfortable bringing a lawsuit against an arbitration provider, the fear of
liability would incentivize arbitration providers to use fair practices. And if one
state were successful in litigation, this would help create popular support for
holding the industry accountable and would pressure other attorneys general
to follow suit. 3
One can imagine that creating a system of government enforcement might
spur the establishment of arbitration providers that only conduct business
within one state so as to minimize the number of potential enforcement
entities. However, smaller providers would have less political clout than larger
actors would, minimizing the problem of regulatory capture. In addition, other
market forces such as economies of scale would help keep large arbitration
providers in business. These providers would be incentivized to play by the
rules because of their potential liability to suits brought in any state in which
they did business. To the extent that arbitration providers did tailor their
behavior to the administrative environment created by state attorneys general,
this could be seen as a good thing, because it would reintroduce a certain
degree of state autonomy into an area in which states have been hindered from
taking independent action by the Federal Arbitration Act. Attorneys general
would likely be more aggressive and engender a stricter adherence to ethical
standards in states where mandatory arbitration was less popular and provide
from these large settlements illustrates the democratic pressure that attorneys general face.
Several challenges to the attorneys' fees were instituted and blame was cast on attorneys
general who had agreed to large contingency fee arrangements. See, e.g., Joseph Giordono,
Tobacco Dividend Sparks Fights; Lawyers Fees Challenged, STATELINE (July 14, 1999),
http://www.stateline.org/live/ViewPage.action?siteNodeld=136&languageld=&contentld=13738.
Actions by state attorneys general have continued to play an important role in high-profile
issues. In February 2012, forty-nine state attorneys general joined a $25 billion settlement
with banks over foreclosure and mortgage servicing abuses. Derek Kravitz, States, Banks
Reach Foreclosure-Abuse Settlement, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 9, 2012,
http://www.seattlepi.com/mount-rainier/article/States-banks-reach-foreclosure-abuse-settlement
-3198884.php.
123. Colin Provost, State Attorneys General, Entrepreneurship, and Consumer Protection in the New
Federalism, 33 PUBLIUS 37 (2003), explains how attorneys general can be seen as
entrepreneurs with incentives to bring politically popular and successful cases. Because the
political incentives to bring cases are different in each state, attorneys general will use a wide
variety of approaches. Id. at 45-47. Thus, we can expect the chances of regulatory capture for
all of them at once to be very low. Furthermore, because they have incentives to bring
successful cases, attorneys general should be expected to bring similar litigation when one of
their peers is successful in another state. Id. at 43. Pioneering attorneys general may first
bring litigation against potential bad actors within the mandatory arbitration industry. If
they unearth cases of real bias and improper conduct, other attorneys general will be
expected to follow suit.
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less oversight in states where people preferred allowing arbitration providers
more independence.
A regime of prosecutorial enforcement by multiple government actors
might alternatively be attacked as too narrow or too broad. Advocates of more
robust enforcement might contend that creating a private cause of action would
eliminate the repeat-player problem most fully.'" Arbitration providers would
have no government officials to whom to ingratiate themselves over time, and
private firms would bring cases so long as they had a chance of winning.
However, because private firms cannot be expected to show the discretion of
public prosecutors, this system would risk overenforcement. Under such a
system, if the statute were written too broadly, then a flood of litigation would
drive costs up and unfairly penalize arbitration providers. The discretion
afforded by only allowing government prosecutors to bring actions would
provide a political check to ensure that responsible arbitration providers are not
prosecuted.
Proponents of private enforcement might argue that Congress could arrive
at an appropriate standard for such a system by passing a first set of
regulations and later revising them through updated statutes. However,
forcing Congress to address mandatory arbitration on several successive
occasions rather than in one fell swoop creates a repeat-player problem of its
own. Not only would passage of multiple bills be extremely difficult in today's
world of legislative gridlock, but successive bills, if passed, would likely be
increasingly favorable to industry because of the concentrated industry's
inherent advantages in mobilizing support across multiple congressional
sessions. Thus, paradoxically, allowing for private enforcement could actually
weaken enforcement powers rather than strengthen them.
Other critics might fear that allowing state attorneys general and other
government litigators authorized to bring affirmative suits a course of action
against mandatory arbitration providers would cause too much and too
aggressive oversight. As with other parens patriae litigation, the main concern
with attorney general oversight is that attorneys general will themselves be
captured by the plaintiffs bar and by consumer protection groups, pursuing
litigation as a means of enriching their plaintiff-lawyer cronies through
contingency-fee partnerships in litigation.' However, this account of
attorneys general as corrupt actors beholden to pro-litigation interests is
124. See Developments in the Law-Access to Courts, supra note 46, at 118o-81.
125. See David A. Dana, Public Interest and Private Lawyers: Toward a Normative Evaluation of
Parens Patriae Litigation by Contingency Fee, 51 DEPAUL L. REv. 315 (2001); Jack Ratliff,
Parens Patriae: An Overview, 74 TUL. L. REv. 1847, 1858 (2000).
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unconvincing."' When state attorneys general choose to seek the help of
outside counsel, their decisions have the potential to be highly visible and
highly scrutinized,' and a number of states require an "open and competitive
bidding process" for contingency-fee arrangements."' In many states,
attorneys general are elected, meaning that their actions must face popular
scrutiny. While it is true that they may receive campaign support from
plaintiffs' attorneys and consumer groups, business interests provide
substantial counterweight in this process. It is precisely because they are held
accountable to such a diversity of interests that attorneys general will likely
administer an appropriate degree of oversight -proving less vulnerable to
regulatory capture by arbitrators than other potential regulators would be, but
also acting pursuant to incentives against bringing frivolous litigation.
C. Holding Drafting Parties as Well as Providers Directly Liable for Wrongdoing
Another important question raised in constructing an enforcement scheme
is who should be liable when systematically biased proceedings occur. In order
to most effectively incentivize fair practices in mandatory arbitration, liability
should be placed directly on the business employing an arbitration provider in
addition to on the arbitration provider itself. This would motivate drafting
parties to choose the providers they believe to be least likely to engage in
prohibited actions and would undermine all incentives for the drafting party to
select a biased arbitrator, attacking the very core of the problem of unfairness
in mandatory arbitration. This liability mechanism would be similar to a
variety of "[o]ther legal regimes [that] extend liability from a primary
wrongdoer to some other party-a 'gatekeeper' or an 'enabler' -who is in a
126. E.g., Dana, supra note 125, at 318-19 (explaining how "[t]he AGs who negotiated
contingency fee arrangements regarding tobacco were, as far as one can discern, quite
sophisticated lawyers" and noting that "[tlhe significant variation in the contingency
agreements suggests" a bona fide negotiation of the terms and not merely passive
agreement).
127. See, e.g., Victor E. Schwartz, Phil Goldberg & Corey Schaecher, Game Over? Why Recent
State Supreme Court Decisions Should End the Attempted Expansion of Public Nuisance Law,
62 OKLA. L. REV. 629, 629-30 (2010) (referring to the high-publicity nature of many
products liability suits brought by state attorneys general in the past decade).
128. Leah Godesky, Note, State Attorneys General and Contingency Fee Arrangements: An Affront to
the Neutrality Doctrine?, 42 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 587, 61o (2009) (explaining that
seven states have already passed legislation requiring open and competitive bidding for
contingency fees). More states are likely to follow. See Dana, supra note 125, at 319
(explaining why such controls are likely to be instituted).
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position to disrupt the wrongdoing by withholding her services or cooperation,
or by taking some preventive measure."1 29
Gatekeeper and vicarious liability regimes incentivize parties facing liability
for wrongdoing engaged in by others to institute proactively policies that
prevent violations. 3o Under Title VII, potential liability for sexual harassment
claims incentivizes employers to take proactive steps so that harassment will
not occur. 3' Similarly, vicarious liability has been promoted to prevent abuses
at managed care organizations because applying liability to the organizations
themselves would lead to "greater efforts . .. to reduce physician malpractice."3 2
Placing liability directly on drafting parties would also incentivize these
businesses to engage in proactive steps to prevent the hiring of biased
arbitration providers. Companies would likely institute policies scrutinizing the
conduct of arbitration providers before hiring, or perhaps they would require
arbitration providers to guarantee fair services or indemnify the company
should any liability be incurred.
Overall, several aspects of mandatory arbitration make placing liability on
drafting parties as well as on providers a particularly appropriate solution for
preventing biased proceedings.' Because detecting violations at the
institutional level is fairly difficult, penalties must be high to deter wrongful
behavior. But, if only arbitration providers were held liable, providers could
blunt the incentive effect of the penalty by rendering themselves judgment-
proof above a low amount. Companies employing arbitration providers would
be less likely to do so, because they necessarily engage in a variety of business
activities unrelated to the arbitration itself and thus would have less incentive
to alter their business structure solely for the purpose of minimizing liability.
In addition, placing liability on drafting parties as well as on arbitration
providers would greatly enhance adherence to fair practices because it would
prevent a few bad actors from spoiling the entire system. A system where only
129. Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345, 365 (2003). Gatekeeper and
vicarious liability regimes are used in a variety of other contexts, including general tort law
(where principal-agent liability applies) and in areas as diverse as securities fraud regulation
and gun manufacturing. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 366. Under Title VII, employers are additionally incentivized to be proactive because
implementation of preventative policies may be taken as an affirmative defense to certain
claims. See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
132. Levinson, supra note 129, at 367.
133. See generally Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement
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arbitration providers were potentially liable would break down if even a small
minority of providers engaged in banned conduct under the statute, because
drafting parties may choose among many different providers. Unscrupulous
and risky providers could quickly attract large amounts of business from clients
seeking favorable proceedings because, unless principal-agent liability could be
proven, drafting parties using their services would be immune from liability
and would thus have a clear incentive to choose biased providers. This
phenomenon would resemble behavior seen in illicit markets. 13 4 For example,
in the market for illegal prescription drugs, "word about the identities of
willing doctors spreads rapidly among drug abusers," so the presence of only a
few doctors willing to flout the law corrupts the entire system."'s
Drafting-party liability is also an especially attractive option in this case
because data disclosed regarding arbitration decision outcomes for different
providers would enable businesses to evaluate effectively whether an
arbitration provider was engaging in overly risky conduct. Holding the
businesses employing arbitration providers liable would also prove more
effective than would holding only providers liable because businesses prefer to
minimize risks in areas where they do not have expertise."' Because the
substance of their business involves matters other than arbitration, drafting
parties have significantly less incentive to engage in such risky behavior than
the arbitration providers themselves do.
In addition, making drafting parties liable would reduce transaction costs
by obviating the need for prosecutors to prove a principal-agent relationship,
as is required for vicarious liability. Furthermore, if a principal-agent
relationship were required for liability, drafting parties would be incentivized
to take a hands-off attitude when they suspected that their arbitration
providers were engaged in wrongdoing. Holding parties accountable even
without a principal-agent relationship, by contrast, would incentivize drafting
parties to take a proactive attitude to ensure fairness.
Holding drafting parties liable in this manner raises the question of what
the appropriate standard by which they should incur such liability is. A regime
of strict liability that automatically places liability on drafting parties if they use
biased arbitrators would create the clearest incentives for drafters cautiously to
select arbitration providers with fair records and would provide the lowest
134. See generally id. at 66-69 (describing the phenomenon of illicit markets in a variety of
contexts).
135. Id. at 67.
136. Cf Rend M. Stulz, Rethinking Risk Management, 9 J. APPLIED CoRP. FIN. 8, 14-15 (1996)
(explaining how firms are incentivized to take risks where they have a comparative
informational advantage).
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transaction costs. However, this is not the only possible option. To alleviate
concerns that a drafting party might be unfairly saddled with liability despite
making its best efforts to secure a fair arbitrator, a more lenient alternative
approach would allow drafting parties to prove their good faith as an
affirmative defense. 37
D. Remedy
Structuring the system of liability in this manner raises the question of
what the proper remedy should be. Unlike appeals addressing the unethical
actions of an individual arbitrator, which raise the natural remedy of vacating
the arbitrator's decision, prosecutions of arbitration providers and drafting
parties that focus primarily on institutional structures and practices rather than
on the facts of each individual case do not suggest a clear or natural form of
relief. One possible penalty would be to vacate all of the decisions decided
within some specified period for an arbitration provider that has engaged in
systematically biased practices. Although perhaps providing the most just
solution, this remedy is unadvisable because of the costs and delays it would
create. The potential for awards to be undone would compromise the finality of
the proceedings, one of the central advantages of mandatory arbitration.
Furthermore, any state legislation proposing vacatur would be preempted
under the FAA."38
Instead, a more appropriate solution would focus on the incentive structure
introduced into the system. A monetary penalty large enough to make
unscrupulous actions uneconomical would be ideal. Consumer protection laws
across a wide range of states disincentivize actions in this manner by imposing
penalties with maximums ranging from $1ooo to $40,000 for each violation.'
In its recently settled lawsuit against the National Arbitration Forum and two
of the arbitrator's primary clients, the City of San Francisco alleged violation of
California's Unfair Competition Law,14o which penalizes violations with a "civil
137. In an even more lenient option, prosecutors could be required to show bad faith by the
drafting party. However, given the difficulty of proving intent, this would likely render
drafting party liability toothless.
138. See infra notes 148-150 and accompanying text.
139. Carolyn L. Carter, Consumer Protection in the States: A so-State Report on Unfair and Deceptive
Acts and Practices Statutes, NAT'L CONSUMER L. CTR. 17-18 (2009), available at
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/report_50_states.pdf
140. See Complaint for Injunctive Relief & Civil Penalties for Violations of Business &
Professions Code Section 17200, People v. Nat'l Arbitration Forum, Inc., No. CGC-o8-
473569 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 24, 2008).
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penalty not to exceed two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) for each
violation." 41
A similar remedy could be constructed through this formalized
enforcement scheme, with the size of the civil remedy structured based on the
average amount disputed in arbitration proceedings under a given provider,
the number of arbitration disputes that were decided under the skewed system,
and the degree of wrongdoing in which the arbitration provider engaged.
Assuming even entirely self-interested companies, biased and unfair
proceedings would be prevented so long as the size of the penalty multiplied by
the chance of catching a bad actor would exceed the benefits gained through
engaging in unfair practices multiplied by the chance of not being caught.' 4 In
order to ensure that all wrongdoing is punished and to most effectively deter
illegal conduct, drafting parties and arbitration providers should be held jointly
and severally liable for the systematically biased proceedings an arbitration
provider carries out on behalf of a drafting party. Joint and several liability
would cause drafting parties to be especially wary of hiring judgment-proof
arbitration providers because this could leave them responsible for the entire
amount of any penalties that might be incurred. Thus, arbitration providers
would be incentivized against attempting to minimize their own assets in order
to escape liability.
While in principle paying this remedy to the victims of unfair arbitration
decisions would provide the most just solution, this could prove costly. It
would require a determination identifying each victim and evaluating the
amount of damages she suffered relative to other victims. Because litigation
would focus on system-wide practices rather than on individual cases,
evaluating each individual case could substantially increase costs or even prove
impossible. Correspondence with victims and distribution of payments would
also prove administratively burdensome.'4 Instead, damages should be paid to
the states whose public prosecutors brought the case. By incentivizing
141. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 172o6(a) (West 20o8).
142. Formally represented, the system would prevent unfair practices so long as Pr > B(1 - r) for
either all drafting parties or all arbitration providers, or both, where P is the penalty, B is the
benefit gained through unfair practices, and r is the risk of getting caught (measured on a
scale of o to 1). The absence of perfect information could cause overconfident and
unscrupulous drafting parties or arbitration providers to attempt to systematically bias
proceedings (by improperly estimating this calculation), but dual liability would force any
drafting party seeking to violate the law to find a similarly overconfident and unscrupulous
arbitration provider in order actually to carry out those actions (and vice versa).
143. In addition, because compensating victims could be seen as tying the remedy to individual
cases, it might present preemption concerns under the FAA if such a remedy were
incorporated into state legislation. See infra notes 148-150 and accompanying text.
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prosecutors to bring cases against arbitration providers operating illegally, this
remedy would align with the primary purpose behind the litigation: to prevent
arbitration providers from engaging in systematic bias.
Holding drafting parties liable for a monetary penalty would also raise the
question of how to apportion liability among different drafting parties where a
biased arbitration provider had rendered judgments for many different parties.
Theoretically, any of the different liability regimes from tort law could be
applied effectively, with the most logical candidates being market-share
liability and joint and several liability.'44
In addition, as they did in the actions pursued by the San Francisco City
Attorney's Office and the Minnesota Attorney General's Office, prosecutors
should also be permitted to negotiate injunctive remedies, forcing actors who
engaged in misconduct to forfeit their ability to resolve future disputes through
mandatory arbitration. 14
E. Implementation
The best and most logical means of implementing this system of
enforcement would be through a federal statute that explicitly enacted each of
these reforms. Yet, in an age of congressional dysfunction, this approach may
prove impossible to carry out in practice.' 6 Short of federal legislative action,
similar but slightly less comprehensive regimes of institutional liability for
systematic bias in mandatory arbitration could potentially be implemented
through two alternative means. First, states might be able to pass legislation
enacting this regime on a state-by-state basis. Second, the newly created
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) could in effect implement this
144. Note that even if a drafting party and an arbitration provider were subject to joint and
several liability for the particular proceedings conducted on behalf of the drafting party (as
this proposal calls for), it is still possible to cap the damages to a particular drafting party
based on its market share of the overall number of proceedings conducted by the arbitration
provider.
145. See supra note 76.
146. Cf Jonathan Zasloff, Courts in the Age of Dysfunction, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 479, 481 & n.8
(2012), http://yalelawjournal.org/2o12/o2/14/zasloff/html (noting the "staggeringly low"
level of legislative activity in the current Congress (quoting Nate Silver, Unfavorable Ratings
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system of reforms with respect to contracts covering financial products through
its rulemaking authority under the Dodd-Frank Act. 47
1. State Implementation
In the absence of federal action, states could implement laws enacting this
proposed system of reforms. Although the Federal Arbitration Act poses
preemption concerns with regard to most state laws that deal specifically with
arbitration contracts,"' there are good reasons to believe that a statewide
regime of institution-level enforcement would be upheld. Significantly,
because this regime would not jeopardize the finality of arbitration agreements,
it would not directly conflict with section 2 of the FAA, which declares that
arbitration awards are "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.""' Until recently,
this section of the FAA has provided the basis for preemption in every Supreme
Court decision striking down state laws governing arbitration,'s so it is
147. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
5 1022, 124 Stat. 1376, 1980-85 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5512).
148. See generally Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 393
(2004) (presenting a four-step framework for evaluating FAA preemption, under step one of
which all laws that single out arbitration contracts are subject to further scrutiny). Applying
Drahozal's analysis to the proposal set forth in this Note does not provide a definitive
answer as to whether or not this system of reform would be preempted under the FAA.
Under step one, the law would single out arbitration agreements for different treatment
than is given to other contracts, so one must proceed to step two. See id. at 407-11. The
parties would not have expressly contracted for application of state law in many cases, so
step three is applied. See id. at 408, 411-15. The law is not preempted under step three
because the law would not invalidate the parties' arbitration agreements. See id. at 408, 415-16.
Finally, the outcome under step four would depend on the "preemption theory" applied,
leaving the results ambiguous. See id. at 408, 416-20.
149. 9 U.S.C. 5 2 (2006).
iso. See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 447 (20o6) (describing section
2 as "the only [FAA] provision that we have applied in state court"); Hiro N. Aragaki,
Arbitration's Suspect Status, 159 U. PA. L. REv. 1233, 1241 (2011) ("The Court's FAA
preemption jurisprudence is based entirely on section 2 of the FAA . . . ."). One court held
that California's ethics standards were preempted by section 2 of the FAA because a breach
of the standards allows for appeal of individual arbitral awards. Mayo v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1116 (N.D. Cal. 2003). By letting individual arbitral
decisions stand, institutional liability would not present this problem. See also Burns, supra
note 62, at 1835 ("The Supreme Court has not definitively addressed the preemptive effect in
state court of FAA sections other than §§ 1 [describing the scope of the FAA] and 2."). More
recent decisions have implied that sections 3, 4, 9, 10, and i of the FAA may also have
preemptive effect. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 174o, 1748-49, 1752-53
(2011) (holding that the FAA preempts California's class action waiver ban and basing the
decision in part on sections 2, 3, and 4 of the FAA and in part on section io of the Act); Hall
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possible that, by avoiding conflict with the enforceability of awards, a regime
providing for liability on the institutional level for systematic bias could be
upheld. By providing damages as a remedy for systematic bias instead of
vacatur of individual awards, this system would also avoid conflict with
sections 9 through i of the FAA, which provide procedures and grounds for
vacating and modifying arbitral awards."' Thus, providing for liability on the
institutional level may offer states a unique means of guarding against bias in
mandatory arbitration in a way that does not conflict with federal policy.'
Although statewide enforcement would be less effective than a nationwide
system because it would limit the number of potential enforcers (thus
increasing the risk of capture)"' and reduce the informative value of disclosure
data,5 4 it would nevertheless represent a significant improvement over the
status quo.
2. Implementation Through the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
Alternatively, or in addition to state efforts, the CFPB could effectively
enact this system of reforms for contracts covering financial products pursuant
to its rulemaking authority under the Dodd-Frank Act."' "Covered person[s]"
under the Act include "any person that engages in offering or providing a
consumer financial product or service.",,, 6 Thus, the CFPB's authority extends
over businesses that include mandatory arbitration agreements in financial
contracts. Mandatory arbitration providers themselves would qualify as
"covered person[s]" assuming that arbitration services for financial contracts
could be described as "a consumer financial product or service.""' This
Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 590-92 (20o8) (basing a preemption
decision on sections 9 through 11 of the FAA).
151. See 9 U.S.C. 5§ 9-11.
152. Even if a court were not to find a direct conflict with one of the FAA's provisions, it might
still hold that, in creating a system of standards for arbitration providers, my regime
conflicts with the FAA's "declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements." Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
However, this argument should fail because these reforms punish unfair practices in
arbitration rather than arbitration itself. Ultimately, by ensuring fairness, these reforms
could even increase trust in and use of mandatory arbitration.
153. See supra notes 122-123 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
155. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1022,
124 Stat. 1376, 1980-85 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. 5 5512).
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construction seems at least plausible because consumer financial arbitration is,
as its name describes, a service provided in the area of consumer finance. If
arbitration providers did not qualify as "covered persons," then penalties
would have to be levied solely on the drafting party rather than on the
arbitration provider as well. The CFPB is required to supervise a covered
person under section io24(b) (1) of the Act so long as the Board has reasonable
cause to determine under section io24(a)(i)(C) that they are "engaging, or
ha[ve] engaged, in conduct that poses risks to consumers with regard to the
offering or provision of consumer financial products or services.",s
Supervision under section io24(b)(i) would require the CFPB to formulate and
enact a set of disclosure requirements.'s
The agency could provide for liability directed at systematically biased
decisions under multiple prongs of the statute. It could act "to prevent a
covered person or service provider from committing or engaging in an unfair,
deceptive, or abusive act or practice under Federal law in connection with any
transaction with a consumer for a consumer financial product or service, or the
offering of a consumer financial product or service.",16o The CFPB could
determine that systematically biased arbitration is an unfair practice because it
"is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably
avoidable by consumers; and ... such substantial injury is not outweighed by
countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.",,61 The CFPB could
also enact this system of liability by arguing that it falls within its authority to
"prohibit or impose conditions or limitations on the use of an agreement
between a covered person and a consumer for a consumer financial product or
service providing for arbitration of any future dispute between the parties.",162
The CFPB could act pursuant to this section of the statute so long as it found
that "such a prohibition or imposition of conditions or limitations is in the
public interest and for the protection of consumers.",16 ,
Significantly, regulations issued by the CFPB would be enforceable not
only by federal authorities, but also by state attorneys general: "[T]he attorney
158. Id. § 1o24(a)(1)(C), 124 Stat. at 1987 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5514).
159. See id. § io24(b)(1), 124 Stat. at 1987 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5514) (requiring the CFPB
to mandate reports "for purposes of . .. (B) obtaining information about the activities and
compliance systems or procedures of such person").
16o. Id. § 1031(a), 124 Stat. at 2005 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. 5 5531).
161. Id. 5 1031(c)(1), 124 Stat. at 20o6 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. 5 5531).
162. Id. 5 1028(b), 124 Stat. at 2004 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. 5 5518). Note that, pursuant to
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general (or the equivalent thereof) of any State may bring a civil action . . . to
enforce provisions of this title or regulations issued under this title, and to
secure remedies under provisions of this title or remedies otherwise provided
under other law. "164 Thus, the CFPB could effectively enact each portion of this
system of reforms by acting pursuant to its authority under different sections
of the Dodd-Frank Act.16s
F. Cost and Efficiency ofan Effective Enforcement Regime
Enforcing this set of standards to ensure fair mandatory arbitration
proceedings would not be cost-free. However, it would be sufficiently
inexpensive so as to preserve the potential for mandatory arbitration to provide
a more efficient alternative to traditional litigation, especially in cases, such as
those in the consumer context, where procedural costs are high relative to
claim size.
Costs associated with data disclosure would be among the primary costs
associated with creating a regime for effective mandatory arbitration
enforcement. But, as discussed above in Section III.D, only a very limited
amount of data would need to be gathered in each case. Nearly all the data to
be recorded are likely already catalogued according to arbitration providers'
own internal procedures, so requiring arbitration providers to make these data
publicly available would not add a significant burden to the process.
California's arbitration providers have been able to comply with newly
instituted data disclosure requirements without apparent difficulty, suggesting
that the process is not overly demanding.16 6
Next, making mandatory arbitration fairer would inherently make the
process more costly insofar as procedures enacted by drafting parties and
arbitration providers to ensure fairness create new costs. Arbitration providers
would have to scrutinize their hiring decisions more closely to ensure that case
outcomes were not playing a role. Requiring arbitrators to adhere to higher
164. Id. § 1042(a)(1), 124 Star. at 2012 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5552).
165. It should be noted that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) might also be able to enforce
liability for systematic bias in mandatory arbitration through its broad power to outlaw
unfair trade practices. See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (20o6). However, while the FTC's actions would
not be limited to the financial products area, only the FTC (and not state attorneys general)
could institute proceedings to enforce penalties for "unfair practices," as defined by the
FTC. See 15 U.S.C. S 45(m). Thus, a regime of liability enforced by the FTC would be more
subject to regulatory capture.
166. Unfortunately, there is a general lack of information regarding the exact cost of compliance
with California's disclosure requirements.
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ethical standards would undeniably introduce some costs, as it has in
California."' Arbitration providers might find it more difficult to attract
arbitrators willing to comply with conflict-of-interest disclosure requirements.
And introducing liability would cause drafting parties to engage in greater
scrutiny of arbitration providers, thus increasing their expenses associated with
choosing a firm. Still, each of these impositions would occur at the institutional
level and would be minimal in comparison to the procedural costs associated
with appeals of individual cases.
Finally, instituting a liability regime would impose costs associated with
the procedure of bringing cases of institutional bias. However, consolidating
actions challenging the fairness of arbitration providers into single cases
alleging systematic abuse would allow for many efficiency gains. Discovery
regarding individual cases of bias would only be necessary to the extent
required to prove a pattern of bias. Such discovery would focus mainly on
arbitration providers' internal documents dealing with systematic practices and
on general data regarding decisional outcomes, so careful scrutiny of each
individual decision would be unnecessary. Furthermore, creating a cause of
action enforceable by a discrete number of individuals would incentivize
organic bargaining to create an efficient system of self-enforcement. Litigation
would likely arise only when negotiation and self-regulation failed to prevent
systematic bias. By restricting costly litigation to these rare cases and
consolidating allegations of abuse into institutional actions, this liability regime
would preserve the inherent structural efficiency advantages enjoyed by
mandatory arbitration. In addition, by restricting enforcement to institutional
actions, this enforcement regime would maintain the finality of original
decisions and would thus preserve all of mandatory arbitration's potential for
swifter decisional outcomes.
CONCLUSION
Overall, mandatory arbitration is a potentially valuable institution,
particularly for situations involving many relatively small claims and high costs
of litigation, where consumers are discouraged from bringing litigation even
for possibly meritorious claims. It offers a potentially more efficient alternative
to litigation by lowering costs for all parties involved, allowing more
consumers and employees to bring their claims and decreasing the backlog of
cases that our judicial system faces.
167. See Glick, California Arbitration Reform, supra note 97, at 129-30.
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Yet mandatory arbitration is rife with the potential for abuse. Businesses
drafting arbitration clauses are incentivized to choose arbitration providers
who are more likely to rule in their favor. Because regulation, enforcement, and
even a basic set of substantive standards by which arbitration providers must
abide are lacking, businesses that select biased arbitrators face few
consequences. Preventing cases of widespread bias is imperative because of the
growing importance of mandatory arbitration to our legal system. The
proposed enforcement scheme outlined in this Note would prevent mandatory
arbitration's use as a general means of skewing dispute resolution proceedings
in favor of corporate drafters of these clauses and would allow arbitration to
become more purely what it promises to be: a system for making more efficient
adjudicatory decisions.
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